The Green Costs of Kelo: Economic Development Takings and Environmental Protection by Somin, Ilya & Adler, Jonathan H.
Washington University Law Review 
Volume 84 Issue 3 
2006 
The Green Costs of Kelo: Economic Development Takings and 
Environmental Protection 
Ilya Somin 
George Mason University School of Law 
Jonathan H. Adler 
Case Western Reserve University School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview 
 Part of the Environmental Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Ilya Somin and Jonathan H. Adler, The Green Costs of Kelo: Economic Development Takings and 
Environmental Protection, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 623 (2006). 
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol84/iss3/3 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open 
Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Law Review by an authorized 
administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact 
digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
623 
THE GREEN COSTS OF KELO:  
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT TAKINGS  
AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 
ILYA SOMIN∗ 
JONATHAN H. ADLER∗∗ 
INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Kelo v. City of New London 
has rekindled the debate over “economic development” takings—
condemnations that transfer property from one private owner to another 
solely on the ground that doing so might improve the local economy or 
increase tax revenue.1 While such takings have been condemned by many 
commentators on both the right and the left, environmentalists have been 
notably absent among Kelo’s critics. Some environmentalists have even 
defended the Kelo decision and the use of eminent domain to spur private 
economic development.2 At the same time, scholarly commentary on Kelo 
and other economic development takings decisions has largely ignored 
their potential environmental effects. 
This Article provides the first detailed analysis of the environmental 
effects of Kelo and economic development takings generally. It contends 
that environmentalist support for economic development takings is 
misguided, and that the rule embodied by the Supreme Court’s Kelo 
decision is bad for property owners and environmental protection alike. 
There is a strong environmental rationale for strictly limiting or 
prohibiting the use of eminent domain for economic development.3 
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 1. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005). 
 2. See infra notes 23–25 and accompanying text. 
 3. It should be noted at the outset that this paper does not contend that Kelo was wrongly 
decided as a matter of constitutional law. The coauthors disagree on this point. In any event, limits on 
the use of eminent domain for economic development need not come from federal courts. As discussed 
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Kelo’s holding that economic development takings are a legitimate 
public use under the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause4 came shortly 
after County of Wayne v. Hathcock,5 in which the Michigan Supreme 
Court overruled Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit,6 
which, at the time, was the most famous earlier decision justifying 
economic development takings.7 While it was not the first decision 
upholding economic development condemnations,8 Poletown was by far 
the most widely publicized and notorious. Public attention primarily 
focused on the massive scale of Detroit’s use of eminent domain; under 
the guise of economic development takings, Detroit destroyed an entire 
neighborhood by condemning numerous businesses, churches, schools, 
and the homes of some 4200 people. After condemnation, the land was 
transferred to General Motors for the construction of a new factory.9  
Like Poletown before it, Kelo was met with public outrage, despite the 
fact that it arguably made few changes to existing federal Takings Clause 
 
 
below, eleven state supreme courts have already banned economic development takings under state 
constitutional law. See infra note 35. In the wake of Kelo, many state legislatures also began to 
consider restrictions on the use of eminent domain. See, e.g., Patricia E. Salkin, U.S. Supreme Court 
Upholds Use of Eminent Domain for Economic Development and Spurs a Firestorm of Legislative 
Activity to Limit Such Authority, MUNICIPAL LAWYER, Summer 2005; see also Timothy Sandefur, The 
“Backlash” So Far: Will Americans Get Meaningful Eminent Domain Reform?, 2006 MICH. ST. L. 
REV. 709 (2006) (showing that eminent domain reform efforts face serious obstacles); Ilya Somin, 
Controlling the Grasping Hand: Economic Development Takings after Kelo, 15 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 
(forthcoming 2007) (manuscript at 64–84, on file with authors), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 874865 (last visited Mar. 11, 2006) [hereinafter 
Somin, Controlling] (discussing early post-Kelo reforms); Ilya Somin, The Limits of Backlash: 
Assessing the Political Response to Kelo (Geo. Mason Univ. Law & Econ., Research Paper No. 7-14, 
2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=976298 [hereinafter Somin, 
Limits of Backlash] (discussing reform in thirty-five states). 
 4. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just 
compensation”). 
 5. 684 N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 2004) (holding that economic development takings are 
unconstitutional).  
 6. Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich. 1981), overruled 
by County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765, 787 (Mich. 2004). 
 7. For a detailed discussion of Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765, see Ilya Somin, Overcoming 
Poletown: County of Wayne v. Hathcock, Economic Development Takings, and the Future of Public 
Use, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1005 (2004) [hereinafter Somin, Overcoming Poletown] (symposium on 
County of Wayne v. Hathcock). For evidence of Poletown’s widespread notoriety, see JEANNIE 
WYLIE, POLETOWN: COMMUNITY BETRAYED 110–38 (1989) (discussing publicity generated by Ralph 
Nader’s role in the case); Somin, Overcoming Poletown, supra, at 1006–07. 
 8. See, e.g., Prince George’s County v. Collington Crossroads, Inc., 339 A.2d 278, 287–88 (Md. 
1975) (holding that “industrial development” qualifies as a legitimate public use). 
 9. See Somin, Overcoming Poletown, supra note 7, at 1016–22 (discussing the impact of the 
Poletown takings); Ilya Somin, Mich. Should Alter Property Grab Rules, DETROIT NEWS, Jan. 8, 2004, 
at 11A [hereinafter Somin, Property Grab] (brief description of the facts and background of 
Poletown). 
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jurisprudence.10 A striking feature of the reaction to Kelo, Poletown, and 
Hathcock was the unusual political coalitions it fostered.11 It is not 
surprising that Kelo was denounced and Hathcock cheered by many 
conservative and libertarian supporters of property rights. Indeed, the Kelo 
property owners were represented by lawyers affiliated with the Institute 
for Justice, a prominent libertarian public interest group.12 Observers 
unfamiliar with the history of economic development takings might be 
more surprised to learn that an amicus brief supporting the property 
owners in Kelo was filed jointly by the NAACP, the AARP, and the 
Southern Christian Leadership Conference.13 In Hathcock, pro-property 
owner amicus briefs included filings by the Michigan branch of the 
American Civil Liberties Union, and left-wing activist and third-party 
presidential candidate Ralph Nader.14 Nader had also been a prominent 
opponent of the original Poletown condemnations in 1981.15 One of the 
present coauthors filed an amicus brief in support of the property owners 
 
 
 10. For detailed discussions of both Kelo’s relationship to precedent and the public backlash to 
the decision, see Somin, Controlling, supra note 3, at 42–84, and Somin, Limits of Backlash, supra 
note 3, at 1–14. See also Charles E. Cohen, Eminent Domain after Kelo v. City of New London: An 
Argument for Banning Economic Development Takings, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 491, 497–98 
(2006) (“[T]he Kelo decision was well grounded in history and case law, right or wrong . . . .”); 
Alberto B. Lopez, Weighing and Reweighing Eminent Domain’s Political Philosophies Post-Kelo, 41 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 237, 283 (2006) (“[T]he only real difference between Kelo and its noteworthy 
predecessors, Berman and Midkiff, is that Kelo presented an economic development justification for 
eminent domain unadorned by more socially appealing purposes such as blight elimination or breaking 
a land oligopoly.”); Sandefur, supra note 3. Although Kelo may not represent a significant change in 
eminent domain jurisprudence, there is some evidence that the use of eminent domain increased after 
the Supreme Court’s decision. See Joyce Howard Price, Eminent Domain Surges After Ruling, WASH. 
TIMES, June 21, 2006, at A4 (reporting on apparent increase in use of eminent domain). 
 11. See infra notes 13–15 and accompanying text. 
 12. For general background on the Institute for Justice and other right-of-center public-interest 
legal organizations, see Jonathan H. Adler, A Vast Right-Wing Conspiracy: It’s Neither Vast nor a 
Conspiracy. Discuss., LEGAL AFFAIRS, May/June 2005, at 62–65; see also BRINGING JUSTICE TO THE 
PEOPLE: THE STORY OF THE FREEDOM-BASED PUBLIC INTEREST LAW MOVEMENT (Lee Edwards, ed., 
2005). For more background on the Institute for Justice, see their website at http://www.ij.org. For 
specific information on their handling of Kelo v. New London, see http://www.ij.org/private_property/ 
connecticut/index.html. 
 13. Brief for NAACP et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Kelo v. City of New London, 
545 U.S. 469 (2005) (No. 04-108), 2004 WL 2811057. 
 14. Brief for Pacific Legal Foundation & ACLU Fund of Michigan as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Defendants-Appellants, County of Wayne v. Hatchcock, 684 N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 2004) (Nos. 124070–
124078), 2004 WL 687839; Brief for Ronald Reosti et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellants, 
County of Wayne v. Hatchcock, 684 N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 2004) (Nos. 124070–124078), available at 
http://www.courts.michigan.gov/supremecourt/Clerk/04-04/124070-78/124070-124078-Amicus.pdf. 
 15. See WYLIE, supra note 7, at 110–51 (1989) (discussing Nader’s role). For a more detailed 
elaboration of Nader’s views on economic development takings, see Ralph Nader & Alan Hirsch, 
Making Eminent Domain Humane, 49 VILL. L. REV. 207 (2004). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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in Kelo on behalf of Jane Jacobs, a prominent urban development theorist 
normally associated with the political left.16  
Many left-of-center scholars and activists oppose economic 
development takings because of their tendency to inflict disproportionate 
harm on the poor and on ethnic minorities, often for the benefit of 
corporate development interests.17 After the Kelo decision was announced, 
it was denounced by numerous liberal political leaders including former 
President Bill Clinton;18 Democratic National Committee Chair Howard 
Dean, who blamed the result on a “Republican-appointed Supreme 
Court;”19 and California Representative Maxine Waters, a prominent 
liberal African-American politician.20  
Environmentalists have been notably absent among Kelo’s critics. The 
American Farmland Trust was one of the few conservation organizations 
to express concern in the immediate wake of the decision.21 Most other 
environmental groups stayed on the sidelines.22 Moreover, some 
prominent environmental lawyers actively supported the City of New 
London’s arguments against judicial limitations on the use of eminent 
domain. John D. Echeverria, executive director of the Georgetown 
Environmental Law & Policy Institute, collaborated on an amicus brief for 
the American Planning Association defending the use of eminent domain 
for economic development.23 The Community Rights Counsel, a public 
interest law firm focusing on environmental issues, filed an amicus brief in 
support of New London on behalf of various local government 
 
 
 16. Brief for Jane Jacobs as Amica Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Kelo v. City of New London, 
545 U.S. 469 (2005) (No. 04-108), 2004 WL 2803191.  
 17. For more detailed discussion and citations, see Somin, Overcoming Poletown, supra note 7, 
at 1005–07; Somin, Controlling, supra note 3, at 18, 65. 
 18. See Erik Kriss, More Seek Curbs on Eminent Domain, SYRACUSE POST-STANDARD, July 31, 
2005, at A16 (noting Clinton’s opposition to the ruling). 
 19. See Howard Dean Comes to Utah to Discuss Politics (KSL TV television broadcast July 16, 
2005), available at http://tv.ksl.com/index.php?nid=39&sid=219221 (last visited Dec. 5, 2005) 
(quoting Dean’s remark denouncing “a Republican appointed [sic] Supreme Court that decided they 
can take your house and put a Sheraton hotel in there”). 
 20. See Charles Hurt, Congress Assails Domain Ruling, WASH. TIMES, July 1, 2005, at A1 
(quoting Waters denouncing Kelo as “the most un-American thing that can be done”). 
 21. See Supreme Court Ruling Has Implications for Private Landowners, FED. UPDATE (Am. 
Farmland Trust, Washington, D.C.), July 7, 2005, http://www.farmland.org/programs/federal/Federal_ 
Updates/0702005.asp. 
 22. Among those environmental groups that frequently participate in environmental litigation 
that neither participated in nor urged a given outcome in the Kelo case were the Natural Resources 
Defense Council, Earthjustice, Environmental Defense, and Friends of the Earth. 
 23. Brief for the American Planning Association et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, 
Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005) (No. 04-108), available at http://www.planning. 
org/amicusbriefs/pdf/kelo.pdf. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol84/iss3/3
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associations.24 After the decision, Environmental Law Institute President 
Leslie Carothers wrote that limiting state and local governments’ use of 
eminent domain for economic development would have been a “serious 
setback” from “an environmental perspective.”25 
Environmentalists have been suspicious of judicial protection of 
property rights under the Takings Clause because of the fear that it might 
impede environmental regulation26 and restrict the use of eminent domain 
to create public parks and other environmental amenities. Whatever the 
merits of this view with respect to other takings issues,27 we contend that it 
has virtually no relevance to judicial bans on “economic development” 
takings.28 More importantly, allowing such condemnations could actually 
harm the environment in several ways. Conservationists and other 
environmental advocates, we suggest, should support barring the use of 
eminent domain for economic development. 
Part I of this Article briefly explains the rationales of the Kelo and 
Hathcock decisions and shows why a Hathcock-like ban on economic 
development takings is highly unlikely to impede environmental 
regulation or threaten the use of eminent domain for legitimate 
conservation purposes. The doctrinal rules advocated by the Hathcock 
 
 
 24. Brief for the National League of Cities et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Kelo 
v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005) (No. 04-108), available at http://www.community 
rights.org/PDFs/Briefs/Kelo.pdf. Community Rights Counsel (CRC) also labeled an early draft of this 
paper the “outrage of the month” in their monthly newsletter, arguing that “voluntary sale of rural 
lands for development poses a far greater threat to environmental quality than eminent domain.” Kelo 
v. the Environment: A Skewed View from the Libertarian Fringe, COMMUNITY RIGHTS REPORT 
(Community Rights Counsel, Washington, D.C.), Apr. 2006, http://www.communityrights.org/PDFs/ 
Newsletters/Apr2006.pdf. 
 25. Leslie Carothers, Strange Bedfellows in the Uproar Over the Kelo Case, ENVTL. FORUM, 
Nov./Dec. 2005, at 56. 
 26. See, e.g., FRANK BOSSELMAN ET AL., THE TAKING ISSUE: A STUDY OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
LIMITS OF GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY TO REGULATE THE USE OF PRIVATELY-OWNED LAND 
WITHOUT PAYING COMPENSATION TO THE OWNERS iv (1973) (“[A]ttempts to solve environmental 
problems through land use regulation are threatened by the fear that they will be challenged in court as 
an unconstitutional taking of property without compensation.”); J. Peter Byrne, Green Property, 7 
CONST. COMMENT. 239 (1990); John D. Echeverria & Julie Lurman, “Perfectly Astounding” Public 
Rights: Wildlife Protection and the Takings Clause, 16 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 331 (2003); Joseph L. Sax, 
Property Rights and the Economy of Nature: Understanding Lucas v. South Carolina Costal Council, 
45 STAN. L. REV. 1433 (1993); Patrick C. McGinley, Regulatory “Takings”: The Remarkable 
Resurrection of Economic Substantive Due Process Analysis in Constitutional Law, 17 ENVTL. L. REP. 
10,369 (1987); Joseph L. Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149 (1971); 
Glenn P. Sugameli, Takings Bills Threaten Private Property, People, and the Environment, 8 
FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 521 (1997). 
 27. For an overview of arguments that environmentalist suspicion of judicially protected property 
rights is misguided, see Jonathan H. Adler, Back to the Future of Conservation: Property Rights and 
Environmental Protection, 1 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 987 (2005). 
 28. See infra Part I. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Court and the Kelo dissenters, and adopted by courts in the eleven states 
that ban economic development takings,29 leave ample room for the use of 
eminent domain to advance environmental goals.30 This doctrinal point is 
buttressed by empirical evidence indicating that none of the eleven states 
with Hathcock-like bans on economic development takings have ever used 
this rule to block condemnation of property for environmental or 
conservation purposes.31 
Part II shows that economic development takings may cause 
environmental harm. Allowing the use of eminent domain for economic 
development poses a particular danger to private conservation lands, 
agricultural lands, and open space.32 Because land owned by conservation 
nonprofits produces few economic benefits and does not contribute to tax 
revenue, it is likely to be targeted by developers and local governments 
that use eminent domain to advance their development interests.33 
Economic development takings can also harm the environment by 
promoting environmentally harmful development, undermining property 
rights, and furthering dubious development plans that sap community 
wealth and reduce resources available for environmental protection.34 In 
many situations, economic development takings end up giving us the 
worst of both worlds: they cause environmental harm and reduce 
economic growth by transferring land to inefficient development projects. 
I. WHY BANNING ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT TAKINGS DOES NOT IMPEDE 
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 
A ban on economic development takings does not threaten government 
efforts to protect environmental values. This is readily demonstrated on 
the basis of both doctrinal analysis and empirical evidence from the eleven 
states whose supreme courts have forbidden the economic development 
rationale.35 None of these states have had successful challenges to 
 
 
 29. See infra note 35. 
 30. See infra Part I.A–B. 
 31. See infra Part I.C. 
 32. See infra Part II.A. 
 33. See infra Part II.A. 
 34. See infra Part II.B. 
 35. The eleven states are Arkansas, Florida, Illinois, Kentucky, Maine, Michigan, Montana, 
Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, and Washington. See City of Little Rock v. Raines, 411 S.W.2d 486, 
494–95 (Ark. 1967) (private economic development project not a public use); Baycol, Inc. v. 
Downtown Dev. Auth., 315 So.2d 451, 457 (Fla. 1975) (holding that a “‘public [economic] benefit’ is 
not synonymous with ‘public purpose’ as a predicate which can justify eminent domain”); Sw. Ill. 
Dev. Auth. v. Nat’l City Envtl., L.L.C., 768 N.E.2d 1, 9–11 (Ill. 2002) (holding that a “contribut[ion] 
to positive economic growth in the region” is not a public use justifying condemnation), cert. denied, 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol84/iss3/3
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environmental regulations arise from their rulings on economic 
development takings.36 At the same time, public officials in these states 
retain the power to use eminent domain for conservation purposes.37 
A. The Rationales of Kelo and Hathcock 
The Kelo decision upheld economic development takings in a case that 
arose from the condemnation of ten residences and five other properties as 
part of a 2000 development plan in New London, Connecticut, which 
sought to transfer the property to private developers.38 None of the 
properties in question were alleged to be “blighted or otherwise in poor 
condition.”39 The condemnations were initiated under a plan prepared by 
the New London Development Corporation (NLDC), a private, nonprofit 
entity established “to assist the city council in economic development 
planning.”40 The city claimed the project would “provide appreciable 
benefits to the community, including, but not limited to, new jobs and 
 
 
537 U.S. 880 (2002); City of Owensboro v. McCormick, 581 S.W.2d 3, 8 (Ky. 1979) (“No ‘public 
use’ is involved where the land of A is condemned merely to enable B to build a factory . . . .”) 
(citation omitted); Opinion of the Justices, 131 A.2d 904, 905–06 (Me. 1957) (holding that private 
“industrial development” to enhance economy not a public use); County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 
N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 2004) (overruling Poletown and holding that economic development takings are 
unconstitutional); City of Bozeman v. Vaniman, 898 P.2d 1208, 1214–15 (Mont. 1995) (holding that a 
condemnation that transfers property to a “private business” is unconstitutional unless the transfer to 
the business is “insignificant” and “incidental” to a public project); City of Norwood v. Horney, 853 
N.E.2d 1115, 1140–41 (Ohio 2006) (following County of Wayne v. Hathcock in holding that 
“economic development” alone does not justify condemnation); Bd. of County Comm’rs of 
Muskogee County v. Lowery, 136 P.3d 639, 642 (Okla. 2006) (holding that “economic development” 
is not a “public purpose” under the Oklahoma Constitution); Ga. Dep’t of Transp. v. Jasper County, 
586 S.E.2d 853, 856 (S.C. 2003) (holding that even a substantial “projected economic benefit” cannot 
justify condemnation); Karesh v. City of Charleston, 247 S.E.2d 342, 345 (S.C. 1978) (striking down 
taking justified only by economic development because such condemnations do not ensure “that the 
public has an enforceable right to a definite and fixed use of the property” (quoting 29 C.J.S. Eminent 
Domain § 31)); In re City of Seattle, 638 P.2d 549, 556–57 (Wash. 1981) (disallowing plan to use 
eminent domain to build retail shopping where purpose was not elimination of blight); Hogue v. Port 
of Seattle, 341 P.2d 171, 187 (Wash. 1959) (denying condemnation of residential property where 
government sought to “devote it to what it considers a higher and better economic use”). In some of 
these states, the wording of the state constitution restricts private-to-private condemnations much more 
explicitly than does the Federal Takings Clause. See, e.g., Muskogee, 136 P.3d at 639, 651–52 
(discussing differences between the wording of the Oklahoma Constitution and that of the Fifth 
Amendment and using the distinction as justification for interpreting the state takings clause in a way 
contrary to the U.S. Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Federal Takings Clause in Kelo). 
 36. See infra Part I.C. 
 37. See infra Part I.C. 
 38. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 472–75 (2005). 
 39. Id. at 2659–60. For a discussion of the significance of “blight” designations for 
condemnation, see infra Part I.B.3. 
 40. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 495. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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increased tax revenue.”41 Landowners challenged the condemnations on 
the ground that such transfers from one private party to another were not 
for a “public use” as required by the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause.42 
The constitutionality of the takings was upheld by the Supreme Court of 
Connecticut in a 4-3 decision.43 The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed in an 
unexpectedly close 5-4 decision.44 
The majority opinion by Justice Stevens focused on the alleged need to 
maintain the Court’s “policy of deference to legislative judgment” on 
public use issues.45 It refused to accept the property owners’ argument that 
the transfer of their property to private developers, rather than to a public 
body, required a heightened degree of judicial scrutiny.46 The Court also 
refused to require the city to provide any evidence that the takings were 
likely to achieve the claimed economic benefits which justified them in the 
first place.47 On all these matters, the Kelo majority chose not to “second-
guess the City’s considered judgments about the efficacy of the 
development plan.”48  
The Kelo Court would uphold almost any economic development 
takings that arises from “an integrated development plan.”49 This 
approach, while slightly less deferential than earlier Supreme Court public 
use decisions,50 still provides little protection for property owners. 
Virtually any condemnation can be legitimized by a plan of some kind—
especially if the Court continues to refuse to “second-guess” the plan’s 
rationale and efficacy.51 
The Michigan Supreme Court’s decision in County of Wayne v. 
Hathcock addressed the same issue as Kelo, but under the Michigan 
Constitution’s takings clause rather than the federal one.52 Overruling 
 
 
 41. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 469–70. 
 42. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 43. Kelo v. City of New London, 843 A.2d 500 (Conn. 2004), aff’d 545 U.S. 469 (2005). 
 44. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 469. The closeness of the outcome was unexpected because the Supreme 
Court had almost completely eliminated public use restrictions on takings in previous decisions. See 
Somin, Property Grab, supra note 9, at 42–55; see generally supra note 10. 
 45. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 480. 
 46. Id. at 487–88. 
 47. Id.  
 48. Id. at 488 
 49. Id. at 487. 
 50. See Somin, Controlling, supra note 3 (explaining why Kelo is marginally less deferential to 
the government than earlier decisions such as Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954) and Hawaii 
Housing Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984)). 
 51. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 488. 
 52. MICH. CONST. art. 10, § 2. The wording of the Michigan state takings clause is actually very 
similar to that of the Federal Constitution. Compare id. (“Private property shall not be taken for public 
use without just compensation therefor being first made or secured in a matter prescribed by law.”), 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol84/iss3/3
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Poletown,53 Hathcock forbade economic development takings.54 Hathcock 
and other decisions striking down the economic development rationale fall 
short, however, of a complete ban on private-to-private condemnations. In 
Hathcock, for example, the Michigan Supreme Court laid out three 
scenarios in which private-to-private takings will still be upheld: 
1. where “public necessity of the extreme sort” requires collective 
action; 
2. where the property remains subject to public oversight after 
transfer to a private entity; and 
3. where the property is selected because of “facts of independent 
public significance” rather than the interests of the private entity to 
which the property is eventually transferred.55 
These three categories, especially the latter two, have been replicated in 
other states that forbid economic development takings.56 Even more 
importantly, neither Hathcock nor other decisions limiting the use of 
eminent domain for economic development forbid condemnations where 
the property is to be transferred to government ownership or to a private 
owner—such as a public utility or common carrier—that is legally 
required to allow the public to access or use the property.57 As a result, 
public officials in these states retain ample means of advancing 
conservation objectives, including the use of eminent domain. Prohibiting 
the use of eminent domain for economic development does not foreclose 
its use for other purposes, including environmental protection.  
 
 
and U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just 
compensation.”). 
 53. Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich. 1981), overruled 
by County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765, 787 (Mich. 2004). 
 54. County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765, 779–86 (Mich. 2004). 
 55. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 783 (quoting Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 
304 N.W.2d 455, 478–80 (Ryan, J., dissenting)). The Hathcock court itself did not originate the three 
exceptions but consciously borrowed them from Justice Ryan’s Poletown dissent. See Hathcock, 684 
N.W.2d. at 780–83 (relying extensively on Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 478–80 (Ryan, J., dissenting)). 
 56. See Somin, Controlling, supra note 3, at 85–88 (noting parallels in other states). 
 57. See, e.g., Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 782 (noting that private-to-private takings are allowed if 
the property “will be devoted to the use of the public, independent of the will of the corporation taking 
it”) (citations omitted). 
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B. Doctrinal Analysis 
Straightforward doctrinal analysis readily shows why bans on 
economic development takings do not forbid condemnation proceedings or 
regulation undertaken for purposes of environmental protection and 
conservation. In other words, very few if any legitimate environmental 
uses of eminent domain are threatened by the Hathcock rule.  
1. Government Ownership 
Perhaps the most important reason why a rejection of Kelo would not 
imperil environmental protection is that a ban on economic development 
takings would not forbid condemnations that transfer property to 
government ownership. This point is universally acknowledged by state 
courts that ban economic development takings58 and also by the U.S. 
Supreme Court dissenters in Kelo.59 As Justice O’Connor notes in the lead 
dissent, the state’s power to condemn “private property” in order to 
transfer it to “public ownership” is “relatively straightforward and 
uncontroversial.”60 
This long-established power encompasses the vast bulk of 
environmentally-related condemnations. If the government condemns land 
in order to establish a state or national park, create a wildlife refuge, 
preserve open space, or acquire valuable natural resources, such a 
condemnation could not be invalidated provided that the land was 
transferred to public ownership. Similarly, should a local government 
condemn a right-of-way for the construction of a government-owned mass 
transit line, public ownership of the right-of-way would authorize the use 
of eminent domain for such purposes. This fact should allay the most 
prominent environmental concerns about potential limits on eminent 
domain. 
The same point applies to most, if not all, environmental regulatory 
takings. Even if one assumes that environmental regulations restricting 
development or potentially harmful land uses are tantamount to the seizure 
of private property, barring the use of eminent domain for economic 
development would not limit the state’s regulatory power. So long as the 
rights condemned by the regulation are not transferred to other private 
 
 
 58. See cases cited in supra note 35, none of which extend the ban on economic development 
takings to takings for public ownership. 
 59. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 497 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 60. Id. 
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parties, they are retained by the government—even if held in the public 
trust and not actually used—and therefore cannot be considered private-to-
private takings. As with any other use of eminent domain, the government 
would have to compensate the landowner for the taking of the land, but 
this requirement is separate from the question of whether a given 
regulatory action constitutes a taking for “public use.” For example, if the 
government restricts the development of private land in order to prevent 
environmental degradation, the aggrieved landowner may seek 
compensation for the “taking,”61 but the action could not be challenged as 
a violation of state or federal public use clauses so long as the government 
did not transfer the development rights in question to another private 
owner. Some would contend that such regulations should not be 
considered takings at all,62 but that issue is separate from the question of 
whether the regulations, assuming that they are takings, can be invalidated 
for lack of a “public use.” Under the reasoning of Hathcock and the Kelo 
dissenters, they could not be. 
2. Private Ownership with Legally Mandated Public Access 
Bans on economic development takings still permit condemnations for 
transfer to government ownership and those that “transfer private property 
to private parties, often common carriers, who make the property available 
for the public’s use—such as with a railroad, a public utility, or a 
stadium.”63 Even Justice Thomas’s dissent in Kelo, which takes the most 
restrictive view of public use of any of the nine Supreme Court justices, 
acknowledges that private-to-private condemnations are constitutional if 
“the public has a legal right to use . . . the property.”64 
In the environmental context, this means that the government could use 
private-to-private condemnations to promote environmental goals so long 
as the new private owners are required to give the general public a legal 
right of access. For example, the government could condemn property for 
transfer to a privately owned park or nature preserve so long as the new 
owners are legally required to provide access to the public. The same 
reasoning would protect the use of eminent domain to facilitate the 
construction of privately run rail lines or other forms of environmentally 
 
 
 61. See, e.g., Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
 62. See, e.g., supra note 26 and sources cited therein.  
 63. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 498 (O’Connor, J., dissenting); id. at 508 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (noting 
that private-to-private condemnations are acceptable if “the public has a legal right to use[] the 
property.”); see also County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765, 782 (Mich. 2004) (same). 
 64. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 508 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p623 Somin-Adler book pages.doc 4/30/2007  
 
 
 
 
 
634 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 84:623 
 
 
 
 
desirable transit infrastructure.65 Such access would not have to be free of 
charge or restrictive conditions. As in the case of public utilities and 
common carriers, the owners of privately owned environmental amenities 
would merely have to guarantee access to all members of the public 
willing to pay a set fee and obey relevant rules. 
3. The Hathcock Exceptions 
The Hathcock decision outlined three additional exceptions to its ban 
on private-to-private takings: cases of “extreme public necessity,” 
situations where the condemned property remained subject to “public 
control,” and, most importantly, instances where the condemnation was 
justified by facts of “independent public significance.”66 In this last 
scenario, which includes cases of blight, “the act of condemnation itself, 
rather than the use to which the condemned land eventually would be put, 
. . . [is the] public use” justifying condemnation.67 For that reason, the 
danger of abuse on behalf of private interest groups is reduced, because it 
allegedly does not matter what the new owners of the property do with it 
so long as the old, harmful uses of the condemned land are mitigated or 
eliminated. On this basis, it is likely that governments could condemn land 
to eliminate environmental harms.68 
The paradigmatic example of this type of scenario is the removal of 
“urban blight for the sake of public health and safety.”69 Forty-six of the 
fifty states, including ten of the eleven that forbid economic development 
takings,70 have statutes that permit condemnation of blighted property for 
redevelopment purposes.71 The Hathcock justification of blight 
 
 
 65. Indeed, the Kelo dissenters acknowledged the legitimacy of using eminent domain to 
facilitate the operations of “common carriers” including railroads. See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 498 
(O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 66. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 783. 
 67. Id.  
 68. It is worth emphasizing that state and local governments retain many other means of 
addressing harmful land uses and blight beyond the exercise of eminent domain, including land-use 
regulations and public nuisance actions. 
 69. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 783 (citing Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 
N.W.2d 455, 478–79 (Mich. 1981) (Ryan, J., dissenting)). 
 70. See cases cited in supra note 35. 
 71. Hudson Hayes Luce, The Meaning of Blight: A Survey of Statutory and Case Law, 35 REAL 
PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 389, 391 (2000); Somin, Limits of Backlash, supra note 3, at 30. The four 
exceptions are Utah, Florida, Nevada, and North Dakota, all of which recently forbade both blight and 
economic development condemnations by statute. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 1713-4-202 (Supp. 2005) 
(outlining powers of redevelopment agencies and omitting the power to use eminent domain for blight 
alleviation or development); FLA. STAT. § 73.014(2) (enacted 2006) (requiring that condemning 
authorities “may not exercise the power of eminent domain to take private property for the purpose of 
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condemnations was also endorsed by Justice O’Connor in the principal 
Kelo dissent.72 As O’Connor explains, with blight condemnations, “a 
public purpose [is] realized when the harmful [blight is] eliminated. 
Because each taking directly achieve[s] a public benefit, it [does] not 
matter that the property was turned over to private use.”73 Justice 
Thomas’s solo dissent in Kelo is the only noteworthy modern judicial 
opinion that even comes close to advocating judicial invalidation of blight 
condemnations.74 
Condemnations that are intended to eliminate sources of pollution or to 
alleviate other kinds of environmental damage could easily be justified on 
exactly the same reasoning as blight condemnations; the sole difference 
between the two is that the latter seek to eliminate dangerous or 
dilapidated structures, while the former target environmental risks. In both 
situations “the act of condemnation itself, rather than the use to which the 
condemned land eventually would be put, [is the] public use” justifying 
condemnation.75 Indeed, some of the harms used to justify blight 
condemnations are in fact environmental in nature, including the “spread 
[of] disease”76 and “health hazards” such as “hazardous waste sites, trash, 
vermin, or fire hazards.”77 Similar rationales could be used to condemn 
abandoned industrial properties or urban brownfields in order to facilitate 
their containment or cleanup.78  
Blight condemnations are hardly unproblematic. Historically, they have 
often been used to displace poor or minority populations for the benefit of 
white middle- or upper-class interests.79 Since World War II, up to four 
 
 
preventing or eliminating slum or blight conditions”); see also Henry Lamb, Utah Bans Eminent 
Domain Use by Redevelopment Agencies, ENV’T & CLIMATE NEWS, June 1, 2005, 
http://www.heartland.org/article.cfm?artID=17162 (describing the politics behind the Utah law). For 
discussion of the Nevada and North Dakota laws, enacted by referendum initiatives in November 
2006, see Somin, Limits of Backlash, supra note 3, at 30. 
 72. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 500 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) 
(endorsing the Supreme Court’s decision to allow blight condemnations in Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 
26 (1954)). 
 73. Id. 
 74. See id. at 519–21 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (suggesting that Berman should perhaps be 
overruled). 
 75. County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765, 783 (Mich. 2004).  
 76. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954). 
 77. Luce, supra note 71, at 395 (noting that fifty-two of fifty-four U.S. jurisdictions include such 
“health hazards” as part of the definition of blight). 
 78. See Hope Whitney, Cities and Superfund: Encouraging Brownfield Redevelopment, 30 
ECOLOGY L.Q. 59, 69–70 (2003) (discussing use of eminent domain in brownfield redevelopment). 
 79. See Wendell E. Pritchett, The “Public Menace” of Blight: Urban Renewal and the Private 
Uses of Eminent Domain, 21 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1 (2003) (providing extensive discussion of the 
history of blight condemnations and the harms they cause); Somin, Controlling, supra note 3, at 91–94 
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million people have been dispossessed in this way.80 Postwar urban 
renewal condemnations were so notorious for targeting African-Americans 
that “[i]n cities across the country, urban renewal came to be known as 
‘Negro removal.’”81 
Furthermore, some states define blight so broadly that almost any 
property becomes vulnerable to condemnation as a result. Recent court 
decisions have upheld blight condemnations in such affluent areas as New 
York City’s Times Square and downtown Las Vegas.82 Even some 
defenders of eminent domain acknowledge that blight designations are 
subject to occasional abuse.83 For present purposes, however, the point at 
issue is not the possibility that the blight exception is too broad and has the 
potential for abuse, but the potential danger that it is too narrow to allow 
for condemnations intended to eliminate environmental harms. Under 
present case law, any such concern is severely misplaced. 
The implications of Hathcock’s other two exceptions for environmental 
takings are more difficult to determine because their scope remains unclear 
as of this writing.84 The exception for “public necessity of the extreme 
sort”85 could potentially be used to justify private-to-private 
condemnations that eliminate major environmental threats, especially if 
there is no other way to address them.86 Similarly, the “public control” 
exception could be used to defend private-to-private environmental 
condemnations “where the property remains subject to public oversight,”87 
as might occur where eminent domain is used to condemn conservation 
easements or rights-of-way across private land. However, the scope of this 
exemption is difficult to predict because the Hathcock court failed to 
 
 
(same); Somin, Overcoming Poletown, supra note 7, at 1035–38 (citing sources and evidence).  
 80. Somin, Overcoming Poletown, supra note 7, at 1037. 
 81. Pritchett supra note 79, at 47. 
 82. Somin, Overcoming Poletown, supra note 7, at 1034 (discussing City of Las Vegas 
Downtown Redev. Agency v. Pappas, 76 P.3d 1, 12–15 (Nev. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 1603 
(2004); W. 41st St. Realty, LLC v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 744 N.Y.S.2d 121 (N.Y. App. Div. 
2002)); see also Ilya Somin, Blight Sweet Blight, LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 14, 2006, at 33 (discussing use 
of extremely broad blight standards to condemn nondilapidated properties). 
 83. See INT’L ECON. DEV. COUNCIL, EMINENT DOMAIN RESOURCE KIT 8, http://www.iedconline. 
org/Downloads/Eminent_Domain_Kit.pdf. 
 84. See Somin, Overcoming Poletown, supra note 7, at 1028–33 (noting ambiguity and 
discussing possible conflicting interpretations). 
 85. County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765, 783 (Mich. 2004). 
 86. The Hathcock court suggests that this exception may only apply if the public project in 
question “requires collective action” through eminent domain in order to acquire the land necessary to 
carry it out. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 783. In many, if not most, instances, local governments will 
have alternatives to the use of eminent domain to address blight and other nuisance-causing land 
conditions. 
 87. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 783. 
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explain how much “public control” is enough to justify an otherwise 
invalid taking.88  
Even if the first and second Hathcock exceptions turn out to provide 
little or no protection to environmental takings, this result would have very 
limited significance. Virtually any environmental taking or regulation 
could be justified by rules permitting takings for government ownership, 
for private entities that allow the public a legal right of access, and those 
intended to alleviate blight and analogous harms. 
Some environmentalists and advocates of economic development 
takings contend that eminent domain can be used to advance 
environmental protection by encouraging infill and the redevelopment of 
older urban areas as an alternative to urban sprawl.89 In some instances, 
eminent domain may be the easiest way to assemble the large, contiguous 
land parcels necessary to make dense urban redevelopment economically 
viable. In addition, some fear that limiting or prohibiting economic 
development takings would prevent the use of eminent domain for 
environmentally beneficial projects. 
It is certainly possible that restricting the use of eminent domain for 
economic development could impede some environmentally desirable 
projects. In our view, however, such concerns are greatly overstated, if not 
completely unwarranted. First, many urban redevelopment projects could 
still proceed under one or more of the Hathcock exceptions. Much urban 
development is planned for areas that could qualify for a blight 
designation. In other instances, eminent domain might be permitted insofar 
as it addresses a public necessity of the extreme sort, beyond the potential 
economic value of the development itself.90  
Where a project does not qualify under these exceptions, there is good 
reason to question the need for eminent domain at all. While eminent 
domain can be used to overcome holdout problems in the assembly of 
large land parcels, there are numerous private sector tools to overcome 
 
 
 88. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 783–83; see also Somin, Overcoming Poletown, supra note 7, at 
1031 (discussing this ambiguity). 
 89. See, e.g., Harold Brodsky, Land Development and the Expanding City, 63 ANNALS ASS’N 
AM. GEOGRAPHERS 159, 163–66 (1973) (arguing that the power of eminent domain should be used to 
promote urban development, thereby preventing sprawl); Carothers, supra note 25; Echeverria & 
Lurman, supra note 26; Thomas W. Merrill, The Misplaced Flight to Substance, 19 PROB. & PROP. 16, 
19–20 (2005) (arguing that economic development takings might be used to prevent “sprawl”); cf. 
Herman G. Berkman, Decentralization and Blighted Vacant Land, 32 LAND ECON. 270, 279–80 
(1956) (arguing that the government should make more urban land available for development in order 
to prevent harmful sprawl); Charles Siemon, Who Bears the Cost? LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 
1987, at 115, 125–26 (same). 
 90. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 783. 
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such problems without the use of eminent domain.91 Where these are 
ineffective, it is highly likely that the reason for failure is the fact that the 
current uses of the property in question are more valuable to society than 
those planned by the developers who seek to acquire it.92  
It is also important to separate the theoretical environmental benefits of 
the widespread use of eminent domain from the practical reality of how 
eminent domain is used by government agencies. Where government 
officials are authorized to condemn property for economic development, 
they become subject to substantial interest group pressures to approve 
projects that benefit parochial private interests, such as commercial 
developers, at the expense of the general public.93 While it is theoretically 
possible that urban redevelopment projects would be undertaken with 
environmental values in mind, this does not appear to be the actual 
practice where private property is taken for economic development 
purposes.94 For this reason, there are very few, if any, instances where 
economic development takings have significantly advanced environmental 
protection.95 Even insofar as such examples exist, the environmental 
benefits of such projects must be weighed against the significant 
environmental risks posed by permitting economic development takings 
generally.96 Moreover, in the rare cases where an economic development 
condemnation might create environmental benefits, it is likely that it could 
be justified under one of the rationales described above. Consequently, 
environmental benefits could be created without legitimizing the economic 
development rationale in the vast number of cases where condemnations 
either do not advance environmental values or actually cause 
environmental harms. 
 
 
 91. See, e.g., Daniel B. Kelly, The “Public Use” Requirement in Eminent Domain Law: A 
Rationale Based on Secret Purchases and Private Influences, 92 Cornell L. Rev. 1, 18–30 (2006). 
(discussing effective private sector alternatives to eminent domain); Somin, Controlling, supra note 3, 
at 21–29 (same). 
 92. See Kelly, supra note 91; Somin, Controlling, supra note 3, at 24–27. 
 93. For a detailed discussion, see Somin, Controlling, supra note 3, at 8–23. 
 94. Even proponents of the use of eminent domain for economic development rarely highlight 
the land conservation or environmental benefits of eminent domain projects. See, e.g., INT’L ECON. 
DEV. COUNCIL, supra note 83. 
 95. See id. at 29 (tangentially noting alleged environmental benefits of one of seven projects 
selected for case studies of the successful use of eminent domain). 
 96. See infra Part II. 
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C. Empirical Evidence from States that Have Banned Economic 
Development Takings 
The conclusion drawn from the above doctrinal analysis is bolstered by 
empirical evidence from the eleven states whose supreme courts have 
banned economic development takings. Despite the lack of doctrinal 
support for the notion, a ban on economic development takings could 
theoretically lead to restrictions on environmental takings through some 
sort of slippery slope process.97 In practice, any such possibility remains 
purely theoretical. 
State supreme courts that ban economic development takings include 
Arkansas, Florida, Illinois, Kentucky, Maine, Michigan, Montana, Ohio, 
Oklahoma, South Carolina, and Washington.98 Two other state supreme 
courts, those of New Hampshire and Massachusetts, significantly restrict 
them without imposing a categorical ban.99 While some of these decisions, 
including the 2004 Hathcock case, are recent,100 others are of longstanding 
vintage. For example, Maine rejected the economic development rationale 
in 1957, Washington in 1959, Arkansas in 1967, Florida in 1975, South 
Carolina in 1978, and Kentucky in 1979.101 More than enough time has 
 
 
 97. See generally Eugene Volokh, Mechanisms of the Slippery Slope, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1026 
(2003). One possible slippery slope mechanism that could lead to restrictions on environmental takings 
might be an argument that some environmental condemnations only benefit specific private 
individuals rather than the general public. For example, neighboring property owners may benefit 
disproportionately from the condemnation of a conservation easement across another landowner’s 
property. 
 98. See infra notes 100–01 and cases cited therein. 
 99. See Opinion of the Justices, 250 N.E.2d 547, 561 (Mass. 1969) (holding that economic 
benefits of a proposed stadium were not enough of a public use to justify condemnation); Merrill v. 
City of Manchester, 499 A.2d 216, 217–18 (N.H. 1985) (holding that condemnation for industrial park 
was not a public use where no harmful condition was being eliminated).  
 100. For example, Oklahoma only forbade economic development takings in 2006, Illinois in 
2002, and Montana in 1995. See Sw. Ill. Dev. Auth. v. Nat’l City Envtl., 768 N.E.2d 1, 9–11 (Ill. 
2002) (holding that a “contribut[ion] to economic growth in the region” is not a public use justifying 
condemnation); City of Bozeman v. Vaniman, 898 P.2d 1208, 1214 (Mont. 1995) (holding that a 
condemnation that transfers property to a “private business” is unconstitutional unless the transfer to 
the business is “insignificant” and “incidental” to a public project); Bd. of County Comm’rs of 
Muskogee County v. Lowery, 136 P.3d 639, 647–52 (Okla. 2006) (holding that “economic 
development” is not a “public purpose” under the Oklahoma state constitution). 
 101. See City of Little Rock v. Raines, 411 S.W.2d 486, 494–95 (Ark. 1967) (holding that a 
private economic development project was not a public use); Baycol, Inc. v. Downtown Dev. Auth., 
315 So.2d 451, 457 (Fla. 1975) (holding that “‘public [economic] benefit’ is not synonymous with 
‘public purpose’ as a predicate which can justify eminent domain”); City of Owensboro v. 
McCormick, 581 S.W.2d 3, 8 (Ky. 1979) (“No ‘public use’ is involved where the land of A is 
condemned merely to enable B to build a factory.”); Opinion of the Justices, 131 A.2d 904, 905–06 
(Me. 1957) (holding that “industrial development” is not a public use); Karesh v. City of Charleston, 
247 S.E.2d 342, 345 (S.C. 1978) (striking down taking justified only by economic development); 
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passed to give courts in these states an opportunity to use the ban on 
economic development takings to restrict environmental condemnations or 
regulations, should they be so inclined. Strikingly, there is not even one 
published opinion in any of these states that has actually done so.102 The 
same holds true for Massachusetts and New Hampshire, the two states 
whose high courts place major restrictions on economic development 
takings without completely banning them. 
Only one published decision comes close to striking down an 
environmental taking on public use grounds in any of the states that ban or 
restrict the economic development rationale. In 1974, the Maine Supreme 
Court invalidated a taking intended to promote the scenic beauty of areas 
adjacent to state highways.103 Yet the court acknowledged that “the 
restoration, preservation and enhancement of scenic beauty adjacent to 
public highways is a public use,”104 and only invalidated the taking at 
issue because the condemnation in question was “unreasonable and an 
abuse of power” under the terms of the Maine statute in question, as 
interpreted in light of state constitutional requirements.105 Whatever the 
merits of this decision, it had no connection to the state’s ban on economic 
development takings. By contrast, at least one decision from the relevant 
states explicitly upheld private-to-private environmental takings against a 
public use challenge, even after the state supreme court had banned 
economic development takings.106 Other decisions from these states have 
also noted that environmental protection is a recognized public use.107  
It is noteworthy that the states analyzed here are ideologically and 
economically diverse. They include conservative states such as Kentucky 
and South Carolina, liberal states such as Washington and Michigan, and 
 
 
Hogue v. Port of Seattle, 341 P.2d 171, 187 (Wash. 1959) (denying condemnation of residential 
property when justification for condemnation was the government’s desire to “devote it to what it 
considers a higher and better economic use”). 
 102. There are also no unpublished opinions reaching such a conclusion in the Westlaw and Lexis 
databases for any of the eleven states. However, we cannot completely rule out the possibility that 
there are unpublished opinions that have not been recorded in an electronic database. Obviously, the 
precedential impact of any such opinions is likely to be extremely small at best. 
 103. Finks v. Me. State Highway Comm’n, 328 A.2d 791, 800 (Me. 1974). 
 104. Id. at 794 (quoting Wes Outdoor Adver. Co. v. Goldberg, 262 A.2d 199, 202 (N.J. 1970)).  
 105. Id. at 799–800. 
 106. See Hallauer v. Spectrum Props., Inc., 18 P.3d 540, 541 (Wash. 2001) (upholding private-to-
private condemnation intended to divert water for purposes of “domestic use, and to ponds for fish 
propagation”). 
 107. See, e.g., Pfeifer v. City of Little Rock, 57 S.W.3d 714, 716 (Ark. 2001) (affirming 
condemnation of private property for creation of a park associated with the Clinton Presidential 
Library); In re City of Long Beach, 82 P.3d 259, 263 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004) (upholding condemnation 
of private property for recreational trail). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol84/iss3/3
p623 Somin-Adler book pages.doc 4/30/2007  
 
 
 
 
 
2006] THE GREEN COSTS OF KELO 641 
 
 
 
 
more centrist states such as Florida and Illinois. Further, they include both 
agricultural states, such as Montana and Kentucky, and more 
industrialized ones such as Michigan and Illinois. However, none of these 
states’ courts have reached the sorts of results that environmentalists might 
fear. While we cannot prove with absolute certainty that there would be no 
restrictions on environmental regulation or various conservation measures 
if a ban on economic development takings were adopted by other states or 
by the United States Supreme Court, the available evidence suggests that 
any such restrictions are highly unlikely. 
II. HOW ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT TAKINGS THREATEN 
ENVIRONMENTAL HARM 
Prohibitions on the use of eminent domain for economic development 
do not hamper environmental protection efforts. Allowing such use of 
eminent domain, on the other hand, poses significant environmental risks, 
particularly to private land conservation. If state and local governments are 
allowed to use eminent domain to promote development, facilitate private 
industry, and expand the local tax base, it is likely that some 
condemnations will target conservation land and open space, including 
property owned by land trusts or otherwise protected with conservation 
easements.108 Insofar as eminent domain is used to subsidize industrial or 
commercial development, it further threatens environmental harm, 
particularly where such development displaces land uses that have less 
intense environmental impacts. Encouraging inefficient land uses and 
excessive development has the potential to increase the environmental 
impacts of economic activity.  
Limiting the use of eminent domain for economic development will not 
end all environmentally harmful uses of eminent domain. Such a rule 
would still allow governments to condemn conservation lands for publicly 
owned projects,109 and would not prevent the use of overbroad blight 
designations to condemn undeveloped land.110 Eminent domain would also 
 
 
 108. See infra Part II.A. 
 109. For example, in December 2005, officials in Willacy County, Texas, announced plans to 
condemn a 1500-acre nature preserve on South Padre Island owned by The Nature Conservancy to 
construct a ferry landing. See James Pinkerton, Nature Area’s Future Shaky, HOUSTON CHRON., Dec. 
18, 2005; see also Carter Smith, South Padre Island Preserve Deserves Our Protection, HOUSTON 
CHRON., Dec. 27, 2005. The proposed use of the land, a public ferry landing designed to increase 
public access to the beaches on South Padre Island, would likely remain permissible if economic 
development takings were prohibited. 
 110. See, e.g., Jim Herron Zamora, Lockyer Challenges Seizure of Land for Private Project, S.F. 
CHRON., July 27, 2005, at B8; see also Somin, Controlling, supra note 3, at 89–91 (discussing 
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remain available for the construction of roads and infrastructure that 
facilitate the development of previously undeveloped lands. Nonetheless, 
the proposed rule can still do much to limit the environmental costs of 
eminent domain, even if it cannot completely eliminate them. 
A. The Threat to Private Land Conservation 
Private conservation efforts in the United States date back over one 
hundred years.111 Environmental organizations, such as the National 
Audubon Society, trace their roots to early efforts to protect species 
habitat and other resources through the use of private property rights.112 
Today, private conservation plays an ever-increasing and indispensable 
role in environmental protection.113 “Leaving rural land protection in the 
hands of counties and states would consign most of the wildlife habitat in 
the nation to oblivion,” warns Dana Beach of the South Carolina Coastal 
Conservation League.114 Land trusts and other private organizations 
“promote a level of innovation and experimentation in private land 
conservation efforts that typically is not found in government controlled 
land conservation programs.”115 Insofar as eminent domain can be used to 
force the development of previously undeveloped land, it poses a threat to 
the vitality of such conservation efforts, particularly those undertaken by 
nonprofits or politically unpopular organizations. The former are 
 
 
increasing use of very broad definitions of blight that could encompass almost any property). 
 111. Dominic P. Parker, Land Trusts and the Choice to Conserve Land with Full Ownership or 
Conservation Easements, 44 NAT. RESOURCES J. 483, 486 (2004) (citing Gordon Abbot, Jr., Historic 
Origins, in PRIVATE OPTIONS: TOOLS AND CONCEPTS FOR LAND CONSERVATION 150, 150–52 
(Barbara Rushmore et al. eds., 1982)). 
 112. See generally FRANK GRAHAM JR., THE AUDUBON ARK: A HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL 
AUDUBON SOCIETY (1990).  
 113. See Federico Cheever & Nancy A. McLaughlin, Why Environmental Lawyers Should Know 
(and Care) About Land Trusts and Their Private Land Conservation Transactions, 34 ENVTL. L. REP. 
10,223, 10,231 (2004) (noting that conservation easements “regularly result[] in a level of land use 
control that private landowners would never tolerate through regulation”); Adam E. Draper, Comment, 
Conservation Easements: Now More than Ever—Overcoming Obstacles to Protect Private Lands, 34 
ENVTL. L. 247, 252 (2004) (“Protecting and conserving private land has become increasingly important 
as a rural lifestyle supported by an urban income has become the new American dream.”); Nancy A. 
McLaughlin, The Role of Land Trusts in Biodiversity Conservation on Private Lands, 38 IDAHO L. 
REV. 453, 459 (2002) [hereinafter Role of Land Trusts] (noting the “increasing recognition of the need 
for non-regulatory approaches to private land conservation”); see also Council on Environmental 
Quality, Special Report: The Public Benefits of Private Conservation, in ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 
363 (1984) (documenting importance of private conservation). 
 114. Dana Beach, Create More Incentives for Easements, OPEN SPACE, Summer 2004, at 13. 
 115. Cheever & McLaughlin, supra note 113, at 10,233; see also Barton H. Thompson, Jr., 
Providing Biodiversity Through Policy Diversity, 38 IDAHO L. REV. 355, 376 (2002). 
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vulnerable to economic development takings because they do not produce 
tax revenue, and the latter because of their political weakness. 
1. Private Land Conservation and Economic Development Takings 
Economic development takings pose a particular threat to privately 
owned undeveloped lands. Such lands rarely generate significant tax 
revenue, nor are they sources of job growth. Large, undeveloped land 
parcels may also be particularly appealing to developers and local 
government officials,116 which makes conservation lands frequent targets 
of eminent domain.117 Palm Springs, California, for example, used 
eminent domain to take thirty acres of land bequeathed as a wildlife 
preserve in order to build a golf course.118 The city even sought to avoid 
paying for the land, but lost in court and was forced to pay $1.2 million.119 
In New Jersey, Citgo Petroleum offered to give Petty’s Island in the 
Delaware River to the state as a nature preserve.120 The site was once used 
by the company, but is now home to many animal species, including 
herons, egrets, and at least one pair of nesting bald eagles.121 The regional 
office of the United States Fish and Wildlife Service supported the 
move,122 but Pennsauken Township had other ideas. It sought to condemn 
the property and turn it over to residential development.123  
 
 
 116. An important part of the appeal of larger, undeveloped parcels is that, other things being 
equal, the transaction costs of assembling a large lot for redevelopment will be lower the smaller the 
number of parcels that need to be acquired. Moreover, fewer parcels mean fewer landowners with 
whom developers must negotiate or against whom local governments must initiate eminent domain 
proceedings. 
 117. See, e.g., Johnston v. Sonoma County Agric. & Open Space Dist., 123 Cal. Rptr. 2d 226, 
238–39 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (easement for wastewater pipeline across land protected by conservation 
easement was obtained involuntarily through threat of eminent domain); Christian Berthelsen, Group 
Battles Toll Road with Prayer, LOS ANGELES TIMES, May 21, 2006, at B3 (conservation easement 
threatened by proposed highway expansion); Carter Smith, Editorial, South Padre Island Faces 
Eminent Threat, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, Dec. 31, 2005, at 11B (eminent domain sought 
against 1500-acre nature preserve); Debbie Swartz, 100 Residents Attend Hearing on Gas Pipeline, 
PRESS & SUN-BULL. (Binghamton, N.Y.), Apr. 5, 2006, at 1B (eminent domain proposed for 
construction of natural gas pipeline through nature preserve). 
 118. Marie Leech, $1.2 Million Agreement Ends 10-Year Land Feud, DESERT SUN (Palm Springs, 
Cal.), Sept. 30, 2001, at 1B. 
 119. See City of Palm Springs v. Living Desert Reserve, 82 Cal. Rptr. 2d 859 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1999); Leech, supra note 118, at 1B. 
 120. Bernie Mixon, Petty’s Island Tug of War Looms, COURIER-POST (Cherry Hill, N.J.), June 30, 
2004, available at http://www.courierpostonline.com/pennsaukenpromise/m063004y.htm. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Elisa Ung, Let Petty’s Be a Park, U.S. Urges, PHILA. INQUIRER, Mar. 10, 2006, at B5. 
 123. Stacie Babula, New Jersey Politics Flare in Scuffle Over Delaware River Island, 
BLOOMBERG NEWS SERVICE, July 28, 2005; Mixon, supra note 120. 
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Agricultural land is also threatened. In the wake of the Kelo decision, 
American Farmland Trust President Ralph Grossi warned, “[w]ith so 
much farmland on the urban edge and near cities still in steep decline, ex-
urban towns could be tempted by this ruling to make farmland available 
for subdivisions.”124 The American Farm Bureau Federation contends that 
the “sparsely developed lands of farmers and ranchers are particularly 
vulnerable” to the use of eminent domain for economic development 
purposes, such as increasing the local tax base.125 As the Federation 
explained in its amicus curiae brief in Kelo, “it will often be the case that 
more intense development by other private individuals or entities for other 
private purposes would yield greater tax revenue to local government.”126  
Local governments frequently seek to use eminent domain to facilitate 
the industrial development of farmland. Bristol, Connecticut, for example, 
condemned a thirty-two-acre tree farm for the creation of an industrial 
park, an action Connecticut courts upheld as a “public use.”127 In 
Kingston, Tennessee, Roane County officials sought to condemn seven 
farms covering 655 acres for an industrial park.128 Hartford, Connecticut, 
used eminent domain to take a mostly wooded parcel of land in an effort 
to keep a local manufacturing facility.129 In New York, the Onondaga 
County Industrial Development Authority sought to obtain 245 acres of 
farmland for residential, commercial, and industrial growth, including 
semiconductor fabrication plants, and was willing to use eminent domain 
if necessary to assemble the lots for development.130 In Greene County, 
Missouri, local officials sought to condemn a dairy farm in order to create 
a new industrial park.131 The condemnation was justified by the city 
 
 
 124. See Supreme Court Ruling Has Implications for Private Landowners, supra note 21. 
 125. Brief for American Farm Bureau Federation et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, at 
3, Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005) (No. 04-108). 
 126. See id. 
 127. DANA BERLINER, PUBLIC POWER, PRIVATE GAIN: A FIVE-YEAR, STATE-BY-STATE REPORT 
EXAMINING THE ABUSE OF EMINENT DOMAIN 46 (2003); see also Bugryn v. City of Bristol, 774 A.2d 
1042 (Conn. App. Ct. 2001). 
 128. Randy Kenner, ‘It’s My Home,’ Roane Landowner Says: County Wants Property for 
Industrial Park, KNOXVILLE NEWS-SENTINEL, July 25, 1999, at B1. When challenged in court, the 
condemnation was declared a “public use,” but was overturned on other legal grounds. See Roane 
County v. Christmas Lumber Co., No. E1999-00370-COA-R9-CV, 2000 Tenn. App. LEXIS 493 
(Tenn. Ct. App. July 27, 2000). 
 129. Maryellen Fillo, Fighting for the Land: Family Battle for Farm Ownership, HARTFORD 
COURANT, Oct. 17, 1999, at B1.  
 130. John Doherty, Clay, Cicero Parcels Tempt Developers: Route 31 Between Morgan Road and 
Route 11 is Seen as County’s Next Big Thing, POST-STANDARD (Syracuse, N.Y.), July 7, 2002, at B1. 
 131. Sylvester Ron, Farm’s Plight Raises Uproar, SPRINGFIELD NEWS-LEADER (MO.), Oct. 14, 
1999, at 1A. 
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manager as “protecting the tax base” and keeping “development closer 
into the city.”132 The plan was later scrapped due to public opposition.133 
While agriculture can have significant environmental effects,134 
farmland is important for the preservation of biodiversity and maintenance 
of open space. As areas once dominated by agriculture are developed, 
farmland is increasingly important for migratory species.135 Such land can 
serve as wildlife “corridors” that offer “opportunities for emigration to 
populate new patches of habitat.”136 Farmland’s contribution to biological 
diversity is different from that of truly undeveloped land. Nonetheless, 
“some agricultural areas with trees may protect as much biodiversity as 
neighboring forests and provide other benefits necessary for proper 
ecosystem functioning.”137 Due to a range of government incentive 
programs and private conservation efforts, an increasing portion of 
agricultural land is explicitly devoted to conservation purposes.138 
Identifying the extent to which eminent domain has been used against 
forest land, farmland, or open space is difficult. There is no comprehensive 
data on the use, let alone threatened use, of eminent domain. According to 
one recent study, only a small fraction of government uses of eminent 
domain are reported.139 Nonetheless, eminent domain has regularly been 
 
 
 132. Id. 
 133. Snyder Carmel Perez, Farm Bills Filter Through Legislature, SPRINGFIELD NEWS-LEADER 
(Mo.), May 21, 2000, at 1B. 
 134. See Ralph E. Heimlich & William D. Anderson, Development at the Urban Fringe and 
Beyond: Impacts on Agriculture and Rural Land, in AGRIC. ECON. REP. 803, at 3 (U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 
2001) (noting that environmental impacts of agriculture are “generally less severe than those from 
urban development”); DAN IMHOFF, HABITAT AND FARMLANDS, http://www.biodiversitypartners.org/ 
habconser/farm/03c.shtml (“massive-scale, industrial agriculture and development” has led to 
“significant losses” for flora and fauna). This is not meant to minimize the potential environmental 
impacts of agriculture, which are typically greatest with so-called “factory farms” and large-scale, 
intensive agricultural enterprises. See generally J.B. Ruhl, Farms, Their Environmental Harms, and 
Environmental Law, 27 ECOLOGY L.Q. 263 (2000). 
 135. KAREN BASSLER ET AL., BIODIVERSITY PROJECT, FARMLAND LOSS AT A GLANCE, 
http://www.biodiversityproject.org/mediakit/Sprawl_1B_farmland_loss.pdf (last visited Nov. 2, 2006). 
 136. Id. 
 137. Peter Bichier, Agroforestry and the Maintenance of Biodiversity, ACTIONBIOSCIENCE.ORG, 
Apr. 2006, http://www.actionbioscience.org/biodiversity/bichier.html. 
 138. See Roger Claasen, Emphasis Shifts in U.S. Agri-Environmental Policy, AMBER WAVES, 
Nov. 2003, http://www.ers.usda.gov/AmberWaves/November03/pdf/emphasis.pdf (summarizing 
federal incentive programs); U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Land Use, Value and Management: Farmland 
Protection (Feb. 28, 2006), http://www.ers.usda.gov/Briefing/LandUse/farmlandprotchapter.htm 
(summarizing public and private farmland protection programs). 
 139. See Dana Berliner, supra note 127, at 2 (“Many, if not most, private condemnations go 
entirely unreported in public sources . . . .”). Connecticut is the only state that keeps records of the use 
of eminent domain for redevelopment purposes. According to the Berliner study, fewer than six 
percent of the uses of eminent domain were reported in news sources searchable through LexisNexis. 
Id. at 8. Of course, it is possible that media coverage of proposed and actual condemnations will 
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used or threatened as a means to promote economic development at the 
expense of agricultural lands, conservation lands, and open space.140 More 
importantly, there are reasons to believe that the frequency of such takings 
will increase in the future as metropolitan areas and their suburbs expand 
into the surrounding countryside and local governments look for new ways 
to create jobs and increase their tax base.141 
The economic development rationale could be used to justify 
condemnation of almost any property.142 Property owned by nonprofit 
institutions is at special risk, however. Since nonprofit institutions do not 
pay property taxes, the condemning authority can always argue that tax 
revenue will increase if their property is transferred to a for-profit 
business. Moreover, many nonprofit institutions are likely to employ fewer 
people and generate less economic activity than do profit-making 
enterprises, further exacerbating their vulnerability. Economic 
development takings may also come at the expense of historic preservation 
if historic buildings are located in areas targeted for condemnation.143  
Environmental trusts are particularly disadvantaged. Since these 
organizations generally seek to keep their property in its pristine natural 
state, they are unlikely to use their land to employ significant numbers of 
people or engage in productive economic activity. Even prior to the Kelo 
decision—and the resulting media attention to the issue—land trusts 
identified eminent domain as a threat to private land conservation. In a 
December 2004 survey conducted by the Land Trust Alliance, eminent 
domain and condemnation were cited as reasons why land currently 
conserved by land trusts might not be protected in the future.144 As one 
park board member observed, “if you put a conservation easement on the 
land and you prevent development on the property, there’s nothing to 
 
 
increase as a result of the controversy generated by the Kelo decision. However, it seems unlikely that 
any such increase in media attention will be permanent, as both the public and reporters are likely to 
move on to other issues as time goes on. 
 140. See supra notes 117–33 and accompanying text. 
 141. See infra notes 166–73 and accompanying text. 
 142. See Somin, Overcoming Poletown, supra note 7, at 1009–10, 1021–22. 
 143. See Berliner, supra note 127, at 83–84 (discussing controversy over use of eminent domain 
to condemn historic Lyric Theater in Lexington, Kentucky); Danielle McNamara, Council OKs 
Redeveloping Downtown Pittsburg, CONTRA COSTA TIMES, Nov. 8, 2005, at A03 (historic building to 
be condemned as part of downtown eminent domain plan); Christine Pelisek, Blight Makes Right?, 
L.A. WEEKLY, July 1, 2005, at 15 (eminent domain threatened against several historic businesses). 
 144. LAND TRUST ALLIANCE, LAND TRUST RESPONSE QUESTIONNAIRE: SURVEY OF LAND 
TRUSTS CONDUCTED FROM DECEMBER 2, 2004—JANUARY 14, 2005 (Feb. 24, 2005), http://www.lta. 
org/sp/survey_results.htm. 
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prevent a future county commission . . . from reclaiming that property 
through eminent domain.”145 
The risk to environmental conservation on private land is significant, 
particularly due to the extent of such conservation. Since the creation of 
the first land trusts over 100 years ago, environmental trusts have 
purchased land, easements, or other property interests to protect the land 
from development or overuse.146 As both the demand for environmental 
conservation and pressures for development on environmentally sensitive 
lands have increased, so too has the use of environmental trusts.147 The 
number of land trusts in the United States rose from under sixty in 1950 to 
over 1200 in 2000.148 In 2004, the Land Trust Alliance reported that there 
were some 1500 local and regional land trusts around the country.149 This 
growth in land trust activity has been fueled by an increased demand for 
environmental conservation and legal developments that facilitate and 
encourage the purchase of conservation easements.150 
The 2003 Land Trust Census conducted by the Land Trust Alliance 
found that local and regional land trusts own some 1.4 million acres of 
land and conserved an additional five million acres through conservation 
easements and other voluntary agreements.151 From 1998 to 2003, the 
amount of land protected by conservation easements more than tripled.152 
These figures exclude lands protected by national conservation 
organizations, such as Ducks Unlimited and The Nature Conservancy.153 
 
 
 145. Jody Callahan, Should Shelby Farms Be a Cash Cow? Debate Rages on Use of Property 
Along Germantown Parkway, COMMERCIAL APPEAL, Sept. 22, 2002, at A1 (quoting Ron Terry, board 
member of Shelby Farms Park who proposed adoption of conservation easements to protect the park 
from development). 
 146. Parker, supra note 111, at 486. See also RICHARD BREWER, CONSERVANCY: THE LAND 
TRUST MOVEMENT IN AMERICA (2003). 
 147. McLaughlin, Role of Land Trusts, supra note 113, at 453 (“Over the past two decades there 
has been an explosion in both the use of conservation easements as a private land conservation tool 
and the number of private nonprofit organizations, typically referred to as ‘land trusts,’ that acquire 
easements.”). 
 148. Parker, supra note 111, at 487–89; Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Conservation Options: Toward 
a Greater Private Role, 21 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 245, 254 (2002) (citing Land Trust Alliance 1998 
Conservation Directory listing over 1200 land trusts). 
 149. See LAND TRUST ALLIANCE, NATIONAL LAND TRUST CENSUS (Aug. 9, 2006), 
http://www.lta.org/census/ [hereinafter LAND TRUST CENSUS]. 
 150. Parker, supra note 111, at 489–96.  
 151. See LAND TRUST CENSUS, supra note 149. An additional 2.8 million acres were protected by 
transferring the land to government entities, or protected through ownership or a conservation 
easement. Id. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Parker, supra note 111, at 487 n.22. Some estimates place the total amount of land protected 
by private conservation organizations at over 15 million acres nationwide. See MARY GRAHAM, THE 
MORNING AFTER EARTH DAY: PRACTICAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS 99 (1999) (citing estimates of 
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In some states, the amount of land protected is quite substantial. The 
Vermont Land Trust, for example, protects over seven percent of the land 
in the entire state of Vermont, mostly through conservation easements.154 
To fully measure the extent of private land conservation, and to 
identify all those lands potentially threatened by eminent domain, one 
would also have to account for the remaining privately owned, currently 
undeveloped land.155 For example, nearly sixty percent of America’s 
forests are privately owned,156 and much of this land is managed, at least 
in part, for conservation purposes.157  
Private land conservation is particularly important for wildlife 
conservation. A significant portion of wildlife habitat is owned by farmers 
and ranchers and is used for agricultural production.158 Over three-fourths 
of those species currently listed as threatened or endangered under the 
Endangered Species Act159 rely upon private land for some or all of their 
habitat.160 As John Turner, President of the Conservation Fund, observed, 
“[n]o strategy to preserve the nation’s overall biodiversity can hope to 
succeed without the willing participation of private landowners.”161 
The biodiversity so prevalent on private land is often located in areas 
under significant pressure for development. While popular discussions of 
biological diversity may focus on wilderness areas and habitats in far-
flung locales, the greatest threats to biodiversity occur where habitat 
 
 
13 and 4.7 million acres conserved by national and local organizations, respectively). 
 154. See David B. Ottaway & Joe Stephens, Land-Trust Boom a Boon for Habitat, WASH. POST, 
Dec. 21, 2003, at A20. 
 155. See McLaughlin, Role of Land Trusts, supra note 113, at 466 (“Although lacking the ‘flash 
and glamour’ associated with the protection of large parcels that have undeniable scenic or habitat 
value, the ordinary parcels protected by land trusts constitute a significant portion of the national 
landscape.”); see also JOHN RANDOLPH, ENVIRONMENTAL LAND USE PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT 
103 (2004) (“One of the most important categories of private land stewardship is those large blocks of 
roadless, natural land not currently in resource production. These are a de facto part of our nation’s 
conservation lands, but they are not permanently protected.”). 
 156. CONSTANCE BEST & LAURIE A. WAYBURN, AMERICA’S PRIVATE FORESTS: STATUS AND 
STEWARDSHIP 3 (2001). 
 157. Substantial amounts of private timber land are managed for conservation purposes during 
long cutting rotations. See, e.g., TERRY L. ANDERSON & DONALD R. LEAL, ENVIRO-CAPITALISTS: 
DOING GOOD WHILE DOING WELL 4–8 (1997) (describing efforts to improve wildlife habitat and 
recreation opportunities on land owned by International Paper). 
 158. See J. BISHOP GREWELL & CLAY J. LANDRY, ECOLOGICAL AGRARIAN: AGRICULTURE’S 
FIRST EVOLUTION IN 10,000 YEARS 92 (2003) (“Three-quarters of the wildlife in the U.S. live on farm 
and ranch lands.”). 
 159. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544. 
 160. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT: INFORMATION ON SPECIES 
PROTECTION ON NONFEDERAL LANDS (1994). 
 161. John F. Turner and Jason C. Rylander, The Private Lands Challenge: Integrating 
Biodiversity Conservation and Private Property, in PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE ENDANGERED 
SPECIES ACT: SAVING HABITATS, PROTECTING HOMES 92, 116 (Jason Shogren ed., 1998). 
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disruption and modification is most prevalent. In fact, the number of 
endangered species tends to be greatest near human development and other 
activities.162 Approximately sixty percent of imperiled plants and 
animals163 are found in metropolitan areas, and thirty-one percent of those 
are found exclusively in such locations.164 Indeed, there is increasing 
recognition of the importance of biodiversity and ecological resources in 
and around urban areas.165 
As private land conservation continues to increase and metropolitan 
areas grow, the potential for conflict will increase. Much land targeted by 
land trusts and other conservation groups for protection is located near 
expanding metropolitan areas and sprawling suburbs. Nearly one-third of 
the land protected by local and regional land trusts lies in the densely 
populated Northeast.166 In many cases, the reason for obtaining a 
conservation easement is to prevent or limit anticipated development. 
These lands are likely to be among the first targeted by government 
officials seeking to create room for suburban expansion or development 
projects. 
There are additional economic reasons why conservation land, 
farmland, and other open spaces may be particularly attractive to 
developers. This land will often be less expensive than other property, 
especially as compared to areas that are already developed. Property set 
aside for agricultural use may also be assessed at a lower value for tax 
purposes.167 Thus, taking such land for economic development purposes 
could provide a greater boost to local tax revenues than other available 
parcels.168 
Because many conservation areas, farms, and the like are located on 
larger land parcels, it will often be much easier to assemble large lots to 
 
 
 162. V. C. Radeloff et al., The Wildland-Urban Interface in the United States, 15 ECOLOGICAL 
APPLICATIONS 799, 803 (2005) (“[T]he number of endangered species tends to be higher where human 
activities are more prevalent.”). 
 163. REID EWING ET AL., NAT’L WILDLIFE FED’N, ENDANGERED BY SPRAWL: HOW RUNAWAY 
DEVELOPMENT THREATENS AMERICA’S WILDLIFE 13 (2005). NatureServe identifies approximately 
6400 U.S. species as imperiled or critically threatened; the U.S. Government’s list of threatened or 
endangered species numbers 1265.  
 164. Id. at 13. 
 165. See Alexander Stille, Wild Cities: It’s a Jungle Out There, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2002, at B7. 
 166. See LAND TRUST ALLIANCE, 2003 NATIONAL LAND TRUST CENSUS TABLES (NOV. 18, 2004), 
http://www.lta.org/census/census_tables.htm. 
 167. In Pennsylvania, for example, agricultural land may be assessed for agricultural purposes 
rather than at market value.  
 168. If land is assessed at a lower value for a given use, such as agriculture, transferring that land 
to another use with a higher tax assessment can increase tax revenue. 
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facilitate larger development projects on such land.169 The economic and 
political costs of condemning a few farms will often be less than those of 
seeking to relocate scores of homeowners from an inner-ring suburb. 
Indeed, this is one of the reasons that some states have enacted statutes 
imposing specific limits on the use of eminent domain against farmland.170 
The federal government also places additional administrative hurdles on 
the taking of parks through eminent domain out of the recognition that 
there are substantial incentives to use such land for many types of 
development.171 As the Supreme Court observed in Citizens of Overton 
Park v. Volpe, governments seeking to assemble large parcels will often 
prefer parkland to available alternatives.172 Among other things, “since 
people do not live or work in parks, if a highway is built on parkland no 
one will have to leave his home or give up his business.”173 The same can 
be said of much privately owned, undeveloped land. 
Conservation easements, when acting alone, do not protect lands from 
eminent domain; they can be extinguished by the use of eminent 
domain.174 In some jurisdictions, however, there are explicit limitations on 
the use of eminent domain to take farmland or other properties covered by 
conservation easements.175 Where such statutory protections do not exist, 
the existence of a conservation easement may actually make some 
properties more vulnerable to economic development takings176 by 
lowering the assessed value of a land parcel, reducing the local tax base, 
and making the parcel less expensive to acquire.177 At the same time, the 
 
 
 169. See supra note 116. 
 170. See Much Ado About Kelo: Eminent Domain and Farmland Protection, E-News (Am. 
Farmland Trust, Washington, D.C.), Dec. 2005, http://www.farmlandinfo.org/documents/30393/ 
Kelo.pdf [hereinafter Much Ado About Kelo]. 
 171. See 23 U.S.C. § 138 (2000) (limiting the use of parkland and other open space for federally 
funded highway projects). 
 172. 401 U.S. 402 (1971). 
 173. Id. at 412. 
 174. Draper, supra note 113, at 266 (“Eminent domain is always a threat to the protective capacity 
of a conservation easement.”); Rebekah Helen Pugh, Conservation Easements as an Effective Growth 
Management Technique, 35 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,556, 10,564 (2005) (conservation easements are 
extinguished by eminent domain); AMERICAN FARMLAND TRUST, FACT SHEET: AGRICULTURAL 
CONSERVATION EASEMENTS, Oct. 2006, http://www.farmlandinfo.org/documents/27762/ACE_06-
10.pdf (same). Some commentators argue that it should be easier to extinguish conservation easements 
when it is in the public interest. See Gerald Korngold, Privately Held Conservation Servitudes: A 
Policy Analysis in the Context of Gross Real Covenants and Easements, 63 TEX. L. REV. 433, 466 
(1984). 
 175. See Much Ado About Kelo, supra note 170, at 2 (noting twelve states have laws limiting the 
use of eminent domain against farmlands enrolled in agricultural districts). 
 176. See id. at 5. 
 177. Id. at 5 (“[E]asements could make land more vulnerable by reducing its value.”); AMERICAN 
FARMLAND TRUST, supra note 174 (same). 
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holder of the conservation easement is likely to place a high subjective 
value on keeping land in an undeveloped state. This suggests that the 
owners of conservation lands may be less willing to negotiate the sale of 
development rights, and more likely to be the sort of “holdouts” often used 
to justify the use of eminent domain in the first place. This also suggests 
that the owners of conservation easements are likely to feel 
undercompensated when their property is taken, as it is likely that they 
place a higher subjective value on the land than the average owner of an 
equivalent plot of land. 
Even if one concludes that the condemnation of conservation lands for 
economic development has been relatively rare to date, there are reasons to 
expect that the rate of such takings will increase in the future. Defenders of 
eminent domain acknowledge that conservation easements “are already 
under challenge in many places, and the social and legal pressure to 
remove or modify easement restrictions will only increase as decades and 
centuries pass.”178 In some communities with substantial amounts of 
conservation activity, opposition to easements appears to be increasing.179 
Some communities dependent on resource extraction are also hostile to 
land trust activity.180  
The proliferation of land trusts and conservation easements is a 
relatively recent phenomenon. While the first private land trust was 
established in 1891,181 state statutes authorizing conservation easements 
did not become common until almost a century later.182 Moreover, a large 
percentage of the land protected by conservation easements is located in or 
near densely populated areas where there is significant urban expansion. 
This is no coincidence, as the threat of approaching development often 
provides the impetus for the creation of a conservation easement, if not the 
outright purchase of land by a local trust. As suburban boundaries expand, 
 
 
 178. John D. Echeverria, Revive the Legacy of Land Use Controls, OPEN SPACE, Summer 2004, at 
12. To Echeverria, the potential threat to the permanence of conservation easements is a reason to rely 
more on government regulation. The authors, on the other hand, would prefer to reduce the threat by 
limiting the use of eminent domain. 
 179. See, e.g., Massiel Ladron de Guevara, Colton Moves to Ease Fly-Habitat Constraints, PRESS-
ENTERPRISE (Riverside, Cal.), Jan. 18, 2006, at B2. 
 180. For an illustration of this hostility, see Tim Findley, “Nature’s Landlord”: The Story of the 
World’s Most Powerful Environmental Group, The Nature Conservancy, RANGE, Spring 2003, at TNC 
1 (characterizing The Nature Conservancy as a “runaway predator” and a “monster”). 
 181. Cheever & McLaughlin, supra note 113, at 10224 (referring to the Trustees of Reservations 
land trust, founded by Charles Norton Eliot in 1891). 
 182. The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws did not draft the 
Uniform Conservation Easement Act (UCEA) until 1981. Pugh, supra note 174, at 10,559; see also id. 
at 10,558 (noting conservation easements have become popular since the 1980s). 
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the pressure to develop the surrounding countryside will only increase.183 
Thus, in those states in which economic development takings are 
permitted, conservation lands and open space will be under relatively 
greater threat. 
2. Lessons from the Experiences of Religious Institutions 
The vulnerability of property owned by nonprofits to economic 
development takings is best documented in cases involving religious 
institutions such as churches. Sixteen churches were destroyed as a result 
of the notorious 1981 Poletown condemnations, which leveled a Detroit 
neighborhood for the purpose of building a new General Motors factory.184 
More recent examples of economic development takings targeting 
religious property include the attempted condemnation of a church in order 
to build a Costco in Cypress, California;185 condemnation of an Illinois 
mosque for the purpose of building private rental housing;186 and the 
taking of an Indiana church for “redevelopment” by new private 
owners.187 Even in the aftermath of Kelo, which has focused public 
attention on eminent domain abuse, authorities in a small city near Tulsa 
are proceeding with plans to condemn a small Baptist church in order to 
“make way for superstores like . . . Home Depot.”188 Similarly, the Hawaii 
Supreme Court recently upheld the condemnation of church property in 
Honolulu for the purpose of benefiting private condominium owners.189  
The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, a public interest law firm, has 
compiled a list of numerous other recent cases where economic 
development condemnations have been used or threatened against 
religious institutions.190 As the Becket Fund amicus brief in Kelo argues:  
 
 
 183. See generally AMERICAN FARMLAND TRUST, FARMING ON THE EDGE: SPRAWLING 
DEVELOPMENT THREATENS AMERICA’S BEST FARMLAND (2002), http://farmland.org/documents/ 
29393/Farming_On_The_Edge_2002.pdf. 
 184. ARMOND COHEN, POLETOWN, DETROIT: A CASE STUDY IN ‘PUBLIC USE’ AND 
REINDUSTRIALIZATION 4 (1982). 
 185.  Cottonwood Christian Ctr. v. Cypress Redev. Agency, 218 F. Supp. 2d 1203, 1225–29 (C.D. 
Cal. 2002). 
 186. Southwest Ill. Dev. Auth. v. Al-Muhajinum, 744 N.E.2d 308 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001). 
 187. City Chapel Evangelical Free Inc. v. City of South Bend, 744 N.E.2d 443 (Ind. 2001). 
 188. Ralph Blumenthal, Humble Church is at Center of Debate on Eminent Domain, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 25, 2006, at A14. 
 189. City and County of Honolulu v. Sherman, 129 P.3d 542 (Haw. 2006). 
 190. Brief for Becket Fund for Religious Liberty as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Kelo v. 
City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005) (No. 04-108), 2004 WL 2787141. The list of cases cited 
here and in the Becket Fund brief probably understates the true extent of the phenomenon because it is 
based upon published decisions and press reports. Many condemnation actions do not result in a 
published decision and/or are not covered by the press. 
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Because religious institutions are overwhelmingly non-profit and 
tax-exempt, they will generate less in tax revenues than virtually 
any proposed commercial or residential use. Accordingly, when a 
municipality considers what properties should be included under 
condemnation plans designed to increase for-profit development 
and increase taxable properties, the non-profit, tax-exempt property 
of religious institutions will by definition always qualify and always 
be vulnerable to seizure.191 
The Becket Fund’s point applies with equal, if not greater, force to 
environmental nonprofits. They also generate less tax revenue than almost 
any “commercial or residential use” properties and will “always be 
vulnerable to seizure” on economic development grounds.192 In many, if 
not most, instances, local and regional land trusts will lack the political 
power that sometimes protects churches with large congregations against 
the threat of eminent domain.193 Whereas churches and other religious 
institutions often have local congregations to protect their interests, land 
trusts often lack an equivalent base of popular support. This may be 
particularly true in the case of larger land trusts that lack local 
memberships, some of which may be viewed as “absentee landlords” by 
local residents. Many lands protected today, such as Hawk Mountain in 
Pennsylvania, would not have been preserved if they were dependent upon 
local political support.194 
3. The Possibility of Circumvention 
One possible objection to our argument is that in most instances where 
eminent domain is used to take undeveloped land, the condemnation 
would be able to proceed under our proposed rule because it would satisfy 
the requirements outlined by the Michigan Supreme Court in Hathcock.195 
 
 
 191. Id. at 11. 
 192. Id. at 11 (emphasis omitted). 
 193. Some argue that churches are often able to protect themselves through the political process. 
See Nicole Stelle Garnett, The Neglected Political Economy of Eminent Domain, 105 MICH. L. REV. 
101, 115–19. However, this is likely to be true only of churches with substantial influence over local 
politics. Cf. id. at 115–17 (describing how the wealthy and locally powerful Catholic Church was able 
to prevent some of its churches from being condemned in Chicago at a time when Catholics were a 
majority of Chicago voters and “both majoritarian and minoritarian forces favored church 
preservation”). Religious institutions affiliated with poor or politically weak denominations are 
unlikely to be equally successful.  
 194. See Council on Environmental Quality, supra note 113, at 387–94 (discussing the history of 
Hawk Mountain). 
 195. 684 N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 2004). 
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A ban on economic development takings can often be circumvented 
through expansive interpretations of blight or other legal maneuvers.196 
For example, when California City took several thousand acres of land in 
the Mojave Desert for the construction of a Hyundai facility and test track, 
it did so by designating the property as blighted, even though it is difficult 
to explain why an ecologically valuable desert should be considered 
blighted.197 The project, labeled a “poster child” for eminent domain abuse 
by California’s Attorney General, harmed local desert tortoise and Mojave 
ground squirrel populations.198 Similarly, a proposed landfill that 
threatened the taking of portions of Duke Forest would likely have 
qualified as a “public use,” even though it threatened a precious natural 
resource.199 In jurisdictions that prohibit pure economic development 
takings, there is pressure to generate blight designations that will pave the 
way for other uses of eminent domain.200 
To be sure, a prohibition on economic development takings will not bar 
all environmentally harmful uses of eminent domain. Environmentally 
harmful takings which transfer land to government ownership would not 
be prohibited.201 In addition, a ban on economic development takings is 
unlikely to be fully effective unless it is coupled with restrictions on the 
definition of blight which prevent blight designations from being applied 
to virtually any property.202 However, a ban on economic development 
takings is almost certainly a necessary prerequisite to any judicial or 
legislative effort to limit the definition of blight. Property owners will 
have little incentive to challenge expansive definitions of blight, and 
 
 
 196. See infra notes 197–200 and accompanying text. 
 197. See Paul Shigley, Lawmakers Threaten to Diminish Eminent Domain Authority, CAL. PLAN. 
& DEV. REP., Sept. 2005, at 5; Robert McClure, Displaced by Automobile Test Facility in California, 
SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, May 3, 2005, at W; Jim Herron Zamora, Lockyer Challenges Seizure 
of Land for Private Project, S.F. CHRON., July 27, 2005, at B8. 
 198. McClure, supra note 197, at W. 
 199. Monte Basgall, Seeing the Forest for the Trees, DUKE RESEARCH (2000–2001), available at 
http://www.dukeresearch.duke.edu/database/pagemaker.cgi?992633500. In order to prevent the use of 
eminent domain to take portions of Duke Forest, Duke entered into an agreement with the National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration that effectively preempted the pending condemnation. Id. 
 200. One of the most notorious recent examples of this sort of “blight abuse” occurred in 
Lakewood, Ohio. In preparation to use eminent domain to clear a neighborhood for an upscale mixed-
use development, local officials commissioned a blight study relying upon blight criteria broad enough 
to encompass approximately ninety percent of all the homes in the city (including the home of the 
then-mayor). See Samuel R. Staley & John P. Blair, Eminent Domain, Private Property, and 
Redevelopment: An Economic Development Analysis, POL’Y STUDY 331 (Reason Public Policy 
Institute, Los Angeles, Cal.), Feb. 2005, available at http://www.reason.org/ps331.pdf. 
 201. See supra Part I.B.1 (explaining that a ban on economic development takings would not 
prohibit condemnations that transfer property to public ownership). 
 202. Somin, Controlling, supra note 3, at 89–91. 
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judges little reason to strike them down, if the condemnation in question 
could just as easily be defended using an economic development rationale.  
Even without additional reforms, a ban on economic development 
takings will prevent at least some exercises of eminent domain that are 
likely to have negative environmental effects. Not all states have 
expansive definitions of blight,203 and a ban on the economic development 
rationale will have a larger impact in states with narrower blight 
statutes.204 Furthermore, requiring developers and local governments to 
obtain a blight designation before condemning environmentally valuable 
land might increase the transaction costs of condemnation and thereby 
deter some uses of eminent domain.205 It is also possible that some 
erroneous blight designations could be challenged successfully in court.206 
Finally, although the issue has not yet been litigated, it is possible that 
some of the more extreme definitions of blight—such as those that define 
it as essentially coextensive with supposedly insufficient economic 
development207—could be struck down as inconsistent with state 
constitutional bans on economic development takings. Without any 
comprehensive data on the use, and threatened use, of eminent domain, it 
is impossible to determine exactly how much protection a ban on 
economic development takings would provide. It is clear, however, that 
such a ban would provide greater protection for environmental values than 
what exists in its absence.  
4. Eminent Domain and Urban Sprawl 
Some environmental analysts and urban planners claim that eminent 
domain is a powerful tool which can be used to protect conservation lands 
 
 
 203. See Luce, supra note 71 (surveying legal definitions of blight in every state). 
 204. Several states have narrowed their definitions of blight in the aftermath of Kelo. See Somin, 
Limits of Backlash, supra note 3, at 21–24. 
 205. For a more detailed discussion of such procedural constraints on eminent domain and their 
limitations, see Somin, Controlling, supra note 3, at 37–40. For arguments that procedural protections 
can have a major impact in limiting eminent domain abuse, see, e.g., Merrill, supra note 89, at 18; 
David J. Barron & Gerald E. Frug, Make Eminent Domain Fair for All, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 12, 
2005, at A14. 
 206. See, e.g., Sweetwater Valley Civic Ass’n v. Nat’l City, 555 P.2d 1099, 1103 (Cal. 1976) 
(holding that property could not be taken under California’s blight condemnation law merely because 
“the area is not being put to its optimum use, or that the land is more valuable for other uses”). 
 207. See, e.g., Las Vegas Downtown Redev. Agency v. Pappas, 76 P.3d 1, 13 (Nev. 2003) 
(“Economic blight involves downward trends in the business community, relocation of existing 
businesses outside of the community, business failures, and loss of sales or visitor volumes.”). 
Obviously, virtually all communities occasionally experience “downward trends in the business 
community” and “business failures.” Id. at 13. 
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and combat urban sprawl.208 Jeff Finkle of the International Economic 
Development Council, for example, warns that if cities cannot use eminent 
domain for redevelopment, “the only land that will be developed is green 
space on the edge of cities.”209 The fear is that if the transactions costs of 
assembling large lots for development are too high in urbanized areas, 
developers will focus their efforts on rural lands.210  
There is some irony in the argument that eminent domain is a defense 
against sprawl, as historically eminent domain has been used to promote 
sprawl far more than to control it.211 Many of the highways and 
transportation projects that have facilitated the geographic expansion of 
metropolitan areas and their suburbs were facilitated by condemnation.212 
Today eminent domain is more often used to limit suburban development, 
but most of those takings do not rely upon the economic development 
rationale.213 As noted above, the limitations we propose do not prevent the 
use of eminent domain to preserve open space or address environmental 
contamination.214 Therefore, the only remaining environmental objection 
is that barring economic development takings would prevent the use of 
eminent domain for projects that would discourage sprawl by redeveloping 
and densifying urban areas, and that such projects can be expected to yield 
net environmental benefits in excess of the expected environmental costs 
of economic development takings. Yet for the reasons discussed earlier, it 
 
 
 208. See supra note 89 and sources cited therein. 
 209. Quoted in Staley & Blair, supra note 200, at 8. 
 210. See Thomas W. Merrill, The Goods, the Bads, and the Ugly, LEGAL AFFAIRS, Jan./Feb. 2005, 
at 18 (“It is much easier to acquire large tracts of land by buying up green fields at the outer fringes of 
urban areas.”). 
 211. This tendency prompted the federal government to limit the use of parkland for federally 
funded highway projects. See infra notes 172–73 and accompanying text. 
 212. See, e.g., Nicole Stelle Garnett, The Public-Use Question as a Takings Problem, 71 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 934, 952 (2003) (noting the construction of the interstate highway system was 
“characterized by a massive exercise of the power of eminent domain that resulted in 
. . . overconsumption of private land”); Terry J. Tondro, Sprawl and Its Enemies: An Introductory 
Discussion of Two Cities’ Efforts to Control Sprawl, 34 CONN. L. REV. 511, 514 (2002) (noting the 
construction of highway networks is one of the “usual suspects” blamed for sprawl because highways 
“open up wide areas of open space to development”). 
 Highways and roads themselves have direct environmental impacts, including habitat 
fragmentation. See, e.g., Richard T.T. Forman, Estimate of the Area Affected Ecologically by the Road 
System in the United States, 14 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 31 (2000) (discussing environmental effects 
of roads); Stephen C. Trombulak & Christopher A. Frissell, Review of Ecological Effects of Roads on 
Terrestrial and Aquatic Communities, 14 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 18 (2000) (same). 
 213. As noted supra Part I, limiting the use of eminent domain for economic development does 
not prevent the use of eminent domain for the creation of parks, the preservation of open space, or the 
adoption of zoning or other land-use controls. 
 214. See supra Part I. 
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is questionable that even the most well-intended projects will produce 
such results.215 
One potential use of eminent domain, which could limit urban sprawl, 
would be to utilize it to promote denser redevelopment. Denser urban 
development can produce significant environmental benefits by reducing 
the footprint of human development on the countryside, among other 
things. However, increased density can also produce environmental costs, 
particularly if it results in more intensive land use or the loss of open 
space. Replacing a low-density residential community along the Atlantic 
Coast with a high-density commercial development, as has been proposed 
in Florida’s Riviera Beach, for example, is likely to have a significant 
impact on the coastal environment.216 Recent research shows that open 
space within urban areas provides substantial public benefits, as reflected 
in local property values.217 Using eminent domain to increase density at 
the expense of such open space would not benefit many communities. 
Theoretically, increased population density in urban settings should 
reduce traffic congestion and air pollution.218 In practice, however, the 
exact opposite appears to occur. As population density increases, so too do 
vehicle miles traveled and urban traffic congestion.219 As a result, those 
areas with the highest population densities have the worst urban air 
pollution.220 One reason for this is that increasing population density 
 
 
 215. See supra Part I. 
 216. See, e.g., Pat Beall, Eminent Domain Case Draws National Spotlight, PALM BEACH POST, 
Dec. 11, 2005, at 1A; Joyce Howard Price, Florida City Considers Eminent Domain: Posh Project 
Would Displace 6,000, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2005, at A01. 
 217. See Vicki Been & Ioan Voicu, The Effect of Community Gardens on Neighboring Property 
Values (N.Y.U., Law and Economics Research Paper Series, Paper No. 06-09, 2006), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=889113. 
 218. See, e.g., Kim Krisberg, Poor Air Quality, Pollution, Endanger Health of Children: 
Designing Healthier Communities for Kids, NATION’S HEALTH, Mar. 1, 2006, available at 
http://www.apha.org/tnh/index.cfm?fa=Print&id=2627. 
 219. See Randall G. Holcombe, The New Urbanism Versus the Market Process, 17 REV. OF 
AUSTRIAN ECON. 285, 290 (2004) (“If traffic congestion is a problem, increasing population density 
will add more traffic to already congested areas, making the problem worse.”); see also Wendell Cox, 
Coping with Traffic Congestion, in A GUIDE TO SMART GROWTH: SHATTERING MYTHS, PROVIDING 
SOLUTIONS 41–42 (Jane S. Shaw & Ronald D. Utt eds., 2000) (“As urban density increases, so do 
vehicle miles traveled per square mile.”). 
 220. See Kenneth Green, Air Quality, Density, and Environmental Degradation, in SMARTER 
GROWTH: MARKET-BASED STRATEGIES FOR LAND-USE PLANNING IN THE 21ST CENTURY 79 (Randall 
G. Holcombe & Samuel R. Staley eds., 2001) (citing data suggesting a correlation with density and 
ambient air pollution); Holcombe, supra note 219, at 287–88 (“[T]he higher the population density, the 
worse the environmental degradation in almost every dimension.”); id. at 288 (“[P]ollution is the 
highest where population density is the highest.”); Randal O’Toole, ISTEA: A Poisonous Brew for 
American Cities, CATO INSTITUTE POLICY ANALYSIS No. 287, Nov. 5, 1997, at 24 (“[I]n major U.S. 
cities and metropolitan areas, smog problems are strongly correlated with population density. . . . 
Cleaner air correlates with lower densities.”); see also Heimlich & Anderson, supra note 134 (noting 
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increases the number of vehicles on the road, even where mass transit is 
available.221 In addition, most vehicle emissions are higher when vehicles 
are traveling at lower speeds, as they are likely to do in urban traffic 
jams.222 The point here is not to argue that dense redevelopment of city 
cores and inner-ring suburbs is, on the whole, environmentally harmful. 
Rather, the point is that dense urban redevelopment is not an unalloyed 
environmental good.223 
Even if one assumes that most urban economic development projects 
that rely upon eminent domain will produce net environmental benefits, 
this does not mean that a legal rule allowing for economic development 
takings will likewise prove environmentally beneficial. If governments can 
use eminent domain for economic development purposes, then it can be 
used for both good and ill. If cities and inner-ring suburbs are allowed to 
use eminent domain to facilitate denser development, outlying 
communities can use it to pave the way for greater suburban growth. The 
same power which enables a city to redevelop an urban core enables a 
suburb to replace open space with an industrial park or a strip mall. In this 
way, eminent domain can be used to promote suburban sprawl and 
metropolitan deconcentration, with all of its attendant social costs.224 In 
assessing the aggregate environmental impacts of economic development 
takings, one must consider both the positive and negative uses of that 
power. Barring the adoption of specific limits on the use of eminent 
domain in particular areas, the permissive approach embodied in the Kelo 
decision is likely to lead to greater environmental harm than the Hathcock 
alternative. 
B. Other Environmental Harms of Economic Development Takings 
Economic development takings can contribute to environmental 
degradation in less direct ways as well. Most clearly, they can be used to 
 
 
air quality improvements from “decentralizing population and employment”). 
 221. See Cox, supra note 219, at 41–42. 
 222. See Cox, supra note 219, at 45. This is true for emissions of carbon monoxide and volatile 
organic compounds at speeds lower than fifty-five miles per hour. Nitrogen oxide emissions, on the 
other hand, increase once average vehicle speeds rise above twenty miles per hour. Id. at 44. 
 223. It is also worth noting that the per capita cost of providing many public services may actually 
increase with population density. See Helen F. Ladd, Population Growth, Density and the Costs of 
Providing Public Services, 29 URB. STUD. 273, 292–93 (1992). 
 224. See generally JOSEPH PERSKY & WIM WIEWEL, WHEN CORPORATIONS LEAVE TOWN: THE 
COSTS AND BENEFITS OF METROPOLITAN JOB SPRAWL (2000). Of course, some would argue that the 
environmental and social costs of sprawl are exaggerated. See, e.g., A GUIDE TO SMART GROWTH: 
SHATTERING MYTHS, PROVIDING SOLUTIONS, supra note 219; WILLIAM T. BOGART, DON’T CALL IT 
SPRAWL (forthcoming); ROBERT BRUEGMANN, SPRAWL: A HISTORY (2005). 
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facilitate unsustainable economic development and the establishment of 
pollution-generating enterprises. Economic development takings operate 
as a subsidy for economic development generally, and often for politically 
powerful interest groups in particular. Such takings represent a subsidy to 
development because, other things being equal, the use of eminent domain 
reduces the costs of proceeding with a given development project for 
developers. Absent the use of eminent domain, developers would have to 
pay a higher price to obtain desired properties, if they are able to acquire 
such properties at all. If development is subsidized in this fashion, there 
will be more of it—and more of the resulting environmental effects, 
ranging from air pollution and congestion to habitat loss and non-point 
source water pollution.225  
There is also a danger that economic development condemnations 
might damage environmental quality by undermining property rights, 
squandering public resources, and reducing communal wealth. Economic 
development takings often lead to the establishment of enterprises that 
could not have survived in a competitive market because they generate 
less economic value than did preexisting land uses.226 Since wealth and 
income are among the strongest correlates of efforts to promote 
environmental quality, economic development takings paradoxically 
undermine environmental quality by dissipating wealth and reducing 
economic growth.  
1. Interest Group Capture of the Eminent Domain Process 
When eminent domain is used for economic development, it is rarely 
public-spirited redevelopment solely overseen by disinterested urban 
planners and “smart growth” advocates. The eminent domain process is 
highly vulnerable to “capture” by narrow interest groups.227 Particularly in 
urban centers, redevelopment plans are the product of competing political 
and economic pressures, including the desires of powerful interest groups 
 
 
 225. See generally U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, About Smart Growth, http://www.epa. 
gov/dced/about_sg.htm (last visited Nov. 2, 2006) (describing environmental impacts of current 
development patterns). 
 226. As already noted, eminent domain operates as a subsidy for economic development. This 
means that the use of eminent domain will allow some projects to proceed that, otherwise, would not 
have. Perhaps the paradigmatic example of economic development projects that fail to generate net 
economic benefits are athletic arenas. See generally ROGER NOLL & ANDREW ZIMBALIST, SPORTS, 
JOBS, AND TAXES: THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF SPORTS TEAMS AND STADIUMS (1997) (summarizing 
research demonstrating public subsidies for sports do not generate net economic benefits).  
 227. See Somin, Controlling, supra note 3, at 8–23; Somin, Overcoming Poletown, supra note 7, 
at 1010–24. 
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and the need to enhance local tax revenue. For a variety of reasons, the 
adoption of economic development takings is far more likely to be driven 
by the political power of beneficiaries than by the prospect of 
environmental or other public benefits.228 Indeed, the bigger the project, 
the more likely it is to be affected by special-interest power. The inevitable 
political compromises limit the likelihood that redevelopment plans will 
meet some theoretical environmental ideal. In some instances, 
redevelopment plans are driven by the developers who will profit from the 
project, and public needs are, at best, an afterthought.229  
2. The Costs of Economic Development Takings are Likely to Exceed 
the Benefits 
Economic development projects rarely produce the economic gains, or 
any other gains for that matter, that their proponents allege. Therefore, it is 
unlikely that economic development takings will generate sufficient 
economic benefits to offset their environmental costs. The notorious 
Poletown condemnations, for example, may actually have destroyed more 
jobs than the development project created in its place.230 The new GM 
factory built as a result of the condemnations created less than half the 
promised 6150 jobs, while the destruction of 150 to 600 businesses and 
numerous nonprofit organizations may well have led to the loss of an 
equal or greater number of positions.231 When one factors in the $250 
million in public funds expended on the project, and the economic cost of 
destroying numerous homes, churches, businesses, and schools, it is highly 
likely that the economic costs of the Poletown condemnations greatly 
outweighed any benefits.232 The same is true of the Kelo condemnations, 
where some $80 billion in public funding has already been expended, with 
little, if any, prospect of commensurate gains.233 
 
 
 228. For a detailed discussion of the reasons, see Somin, Controlling, supra note 3, at 8–23; 
Somin, Overcoming Poletown, supra note 7, at 1010–24. 
 229. See Somin, Controlling, supra note 3, at 8–23; Somin, Overcoming Poletown, supra note 7, 
at 1010–24. 
 230. See Nicole Gelinas, They’re Taking Away Your Property for What?, CITY J., Autumn 2005, 
available at http://www.city-journal.org/html/15_4_eminent_domain.html; Somin, Overcoming 
Poletown, supra note 7, at 1012–13, 1017–18 (discussing conflicting estimates of job losses resulting 
from Poletown).  
 231. Somin, Overcoming Poletown, supra note 7, at 1017–18. 
 232.  Id. 
 233. See Kelo v. City of New London, 843 A.2d 500, 596–600 (Conn. 2004) (Zarella, J., 
dissenting), aff’d 545 U.S. 469 (2005) (noting costs of project and low prospect of commensurate 
benefits); Kate Moran, Developer Says Fort Trumbull Hotel Plan Not Viable Since 2002; Project 
Became Unrealistic Without Pfizer Commitment, THE DAY (New London, Conn.), June 12, 2004, at 
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These results are not accidental. There are several systematic reasons 
why economic development takings are likely to generate costs that 
exceed their benefits. First, none of the states that permit economic 
development takings require the new owners of condemned property to 
actually produce the economic benefits that were used to justify 
condemnation in the first place.234 This, combined with the refusal of 
courts in these states to consider the economic costs imposed by 
condemnation projects in their decisions,235 gives local governments and 
developers strong incentives to oversell condemnation projects by using 
inflated estimates of their benefits. In other cases, local officials promise 
that projects will spur economic development without identifying what is 
to be developed.236 
Second, the more economic development projects are subsidized 
through the use of eminent domain, the more likely it is that inefficient 
projects will proceed. As former Milwaukee mayor and president of the 
Congress for New Urbanism John Norquist argued in his Kelo amicus 
brief, “speculative over-use of eminent domain may actually have a 
chilling effect on the rigorous economic screening of projects naturally 
occurring in the private marketplace, and may result in an increased 
number of unsustainable development projects.”237 If large eminent 
domain projects fail to produce the job growth or tax revenues promised 
by their proponents, why should one expect them to generate promised 
environmental benefits? 
Further, the costs and benefits of economic development takings are 
extremely difficult for voters to determine, which ensures that officials 
who approve inefficient development projects will rarely, if ever, be 
punished at the ballot box.238 Even in cases where it is possible for voters 
 
 
C4 (discussing development project’s lack of viability); William Yardley, After Eminent Domain 
Victory, Disputed Project Goes Nowhere, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2005, at A1. 
 234. See Somin, Controlling, supra note 3, at 10–15. 
 235. See Kelo, 843 A.2d at 541 n.58 (refusing to consider costs imposed by condemnation because 
“the balancing of the benefits and social costs of a particular project is uniquely a legislative 
function”); Somin, Controlling, supra note 3, at 15–17 (describing failure to consider costs). 
 236. See, e.g., Krauter v. Lower Big Blue Nat. Res. Dist., 259 N.W.2d 472, 475–76 (Neb. 1977) 
(striking down condemnation because there was no clear plan as to how the condemned property 
would be used).  
 237. Brief for John Norquist, President, Congress for New Urbanism, as Amicus Curiae 
Supporting Petitioners, at 3, Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005) (No. 04-108), 
available at http://www.ij.org/pdf_folderprivate_property/kelo-norquist08.pdf; see also Gelinas, supra 
note 230 (“In the free market, a poorly designed project will fail and be replaced by a well-designed 
project—or just won’t find private financing to get built. With government central planning, ill-
designed projects last forever—and they retard natural growth around them.”). 
 238. Somin, Controlling, supra note 3, at 19–21. 
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to determine the costs and benefits accurately, any such accounting is 
unlikely to be feasible until years after the fact, by which time many of the 
officials who approved the condemnation are likely to be out of office.239 
In any event, by that point public attention will have moved on to other 
issues.  
Finally, the need to prevent “holdouts”—the standard rationale for 
economic development takings—can in most cases be addressed without 
resort to eminent domain. If a private development project really will use 
the property for purposes more valuable than those to which it is currently 
devoted, the developers can prevent holdouts from blocking the project by 
using secret purchases or precommitment strategies.240 Of course, where 
conservation groups, or others, place a high subjective value on 
maintaining given lands in an undeveloped state, they should not be 
considered holdouts. Such landowners are not engaged in strategic 
behavior in order to maximize their compensation, but are rather “sincere 
dissenters” from the merits of the development project who genuinely 
value the current uses of the land more than the developer values his or her 
own projected uses.241 
3. Endangering the Environmental Benefits of Property Rights 
Eminent domain is generally viewed as a threat to property rights, as 
evidenced by the strong negative reaction to the Kelo decision by various 
groups representing property owners. The rule ratified in Kelo is, 
regardless of its other merits, less protective of property rights than that 
urged by the Kelo dissenters and also adopted by the Michigan Supreme 
Court in Hathcock. This, too, could have negative environmental 
consequences insofar as it undermines the security of property rights on 
the margin. Individuals are less likely to make investments in the long-
term conservation of environmental resources on private land when they 
are uncertain if their investments will bear fruit.242  
International studies of economic and environmental trends 
demonstrate that “environmental quality and economic growth rates are 
greater in regimes where property rights are well defined than in regimes 
 
 
 239. Id. 
 240. For detailed explanations of the reasons why this is true, see Kelly, supra note 91; Somin, 
Controlling, supra note 3, at 21–28.  
 241. See Somin, Controlling, supra note 3, at 23 (distinguishing strategic holdouts and sincere 
dissenters). 
 242. See Staley & Blair, supra note 200, at 2. 
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where property rights are poorly defined.”243 The security of property 
rights encourages owners to pursue the enhancement of their own 
subjective value preferences, including both commercial and non-
commercial values.244 Property rights enable forest landowners to protect 
their investment in planting trees or otherwise enhancing forest growth;245 
investments made by conservation groups in ecological protection and 
restoration are also protected.246 Conversely, a lack of property rights 
provides substantial incentives to deplete valuable resources.247 Where 
property rights are not secure, owners are less likely to invest in improving 
or protecting a resource, and are more likely to consume it as quickly as 
possible in a “tragedy of the commons” scenario.248 On the margin, the 
more purposes for which government authorities may exercise eminent 
domain, the less secure private property rights will be. 
4. Endangering the Environment by Reducing Societal Wealth 
The history of condemnation for economic development raises further 
concerns. As discussed above, economic development takings are more 
likely to retard economic growth than enhance it.249 Condemnations can 
 
 
 243. Seth W. Norton, Property Rights, the Environment, and Economic Well-Being, in WHO 
OWNS THE ENVIRONMENT? 37, 51 (Peter J. Hill & Roger E. Meiners eds., 1998); see also Don 
Coursey & Christopher Hartwell, Environmental and Public Health Outcomes: An International and 
Historical Comparison (Harris Sch. Pub. Policy, Working Paper No. 00.10, 2000), available at 
http://www.harrisschool.uchicago.edu/about/publications/working-papers/pdf/wp_00-10.pdf (finding 
that, across the board, greater governmental regulation of private activity correlates with higher levels 
of emissions and worse public health indicators). 
 244. See Louis De Alessi, Gains from Private Property: The Empirical Evidence, in PROPERTY 
RIGHTS: COOPERATION, CONFLICT, AND LAW 90, 108 (Terry L. Anderson & Fred S. McChesney eds., 
2003); see also Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347, 356 
(1967) (“The development of private rights permits the owner to economize on the use of those 
resources from which he has the right to exclude others.”); Robert J. Smith, Resolving the Tragedy of 
the Commons by Creating Private Property Rights in Wildlife, 1 CATO J. 439, 456 (1981) (“Wherever 
we have exclusive private ownership, whether it is organized around a profit-seeking or nonprofit 
undertaking, there are incentives for the private owners to preserve the resource.”).  
 245. See Jonathan H. Adler, Poplar Front: The Rebirth of America’s Forests, in ECOLOGY, 
LIBERTY & PROPERTY 65, 71–72 (Jonathan H. Adler ed., 2000) (noting higher rates of forest growth 
on private land than on federally owned forest land). 
 246. See Smith, supra note 244, at 456 (private ownership protects both for-profit and nonprofit 
undertakings). 
 247. As Anthony Scott observes, “[n]o one will take the trouble to husband and maintain a 
resource unless he has a reasonable certainty of receiving some portion of the product of his 
management; that is, unless he has some property right in the yield.” Anthony Scott, The Fishery: The 
Objectives of Sole Ownership, 63 J. POL. ECON. 116, 116 (1955). While it may be an overstatement to 
claim that “no one” will act in such a manner, the marginal effect should be indisputable. Id.  
 248. For the classic analysis, see Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, SCIENCE, Dec. 13, 
1968, at 1243. 
 249. See supra Part II.B.2 (explaining why the economic costs of development takings are likely 
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increase the amount of development—for instance by creating an 
industrial park or facilitating a given redevelopment project—but this is 
not the same thing as increasing economic growth and societal wealth. In 
some cases, economic development condemnations may provide the worst 
of both worlds by increasing the amount of environmentally harmful 
development while simultaneously retarding overall economic growth.  
Economic development takings are unlikely to provide economic 
benefits sufficient to offset the costs, environmental and otherwise. Insofar 
as this is the case, using eminent domain for economic development 
squanders scarce resources and retards the accumulation of societal 
wealth. This, too, can have negative environmental effects of its own. 
Wealthier societies have both the means and the desire to address a wider 
array of environmental concerns.250 Economic growth fuels technological 
advances and generates the resources necessary to deploy new methods for 
meeting human needs efficiently and effectively.251 Public support for 
environmental measures, both public and private, is correlated with 
changes in personal income.252 This is evidenced by the fact that donors to 
environmental groups tend to have above-average incomes.253 Empirical 
 
 
to exceed the benefits); see also Gelinas, supra note 230 (discussing New Haven, Connecticut, as an 
example of where redevelopment projects likely did more harm than good); Thomas Garrett & Paul 
Rothstein, The Taking of Prosperity: Kelo v. New London and the Economics of Eminent Domain, 
REGIONAL ECONOMIST, Jan. 2007, at 4 (summarizing reasons why economic development takings are 
likely to diminish prosperity rather than increase it). 
 250. See RICHARD L. STROUP, ECO-NOMICS: WHAT EVERYONE SHOULD KNOW ABOUT 
ECONOMICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT 13–14 (2003); Jason Scott Johnston, On the Market for 
Ecosystem Control, 21 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 129, 146 (2002) (“There is abundant evidence that the demand 
for outdoor recreation and environmental amenities increases with national income.”); Matthew E. 
Kahn & John G. Matsusaka, Demand for Environmental Goods: Evidence from Voting Patterns on 
California Initiatives, 40 J.L. & ECON. 137 (1997) (noting that most environmental goods are normal 
goods for which demand rises with income); Patrick Low, Trade and the Environment: What Worries 
the Developing Countries?, 23 ENVTL. L. 705, 706 (1993) (“[T]he demand for improved environmental 
quality tends to rise with income.”); Kenneth E. McConnell, Income and the Demand for 
Environmental Quality, 2 ENVTL. & DEV. ECON. 383, 385–86 (1997) (reporting on empirical evidence 
on environmental Kuznets curve); Norton, supra note 243, at 45 (noting that, insofar as environmental 
quality is viewed as a “good,” consumption of environmental quality will increase as wealth 
increases); Bruce Yandle et al., The Environmental Kuznets Curve: A Review of Findings, Methods, 
and Policy Implications, PERC RES. STUD., Apr. 2004), http://www.perc.org/pdf/rs02_1a.pdf.  
 251. See, e.g., AARON WILDAVSKY, SEARCHING FOR SAFETY (1988) (providing extensive 
arguments and evidence showing that increasing societal wealth produces environmental and safety 
benefits). 
 252. Richard L. Stroup & Roger E. Meiners, Introduction: The Toxic Liability Problem: Why Is It 
Too Large?, in CUTTING GREEN TAPE: TOXIC POLLUTANTS, ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION AND THE 
LAW 1, 15 (Richard L. Stroup & Roger E. Meiners eds., 2000) (“Willingness to pay for environmental 
measures . . . is highly elastic with respect to income.”). This is also true for charity in general. See 
RICHARD B. MCKENZIE, WHAT WENT RIGHT IN THE 1980S 70 (1994) (noting that “[h]igher incomes 
lead to increased giving”). 
 253. Stroup & Meiners, supra note 252, at 15 (discussing 1992 reader survey for Sierra magazine 
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evidence also suggests that wealthier communities are more likely to 
support governmental efforts to preserve open space through the use of 
bond issues and other local measures.254 While the marginal effects of this 
phenomenon may be small in any given case, the loss of societal wealth is 
yet another negative environmental consequence that must be added to the 
ledger when assessing the environmental impact of using eminent domain 
for economic development. 
CONCLUSION 
From an environmental perspective, eminent domain is a two-edged 
sword. It can be used to provide environmental public goods and preserve 
undeveloped land. At the same time, however, it can also be used to 
condemn farms, extinguish conservation easements, subsidize unsound 
development, and pave the way for suburban expansion into the 
countryside. Whatever the overall impact of eminent domain on the 
environment, it is clear that its use for economic development has 
considerable environmental costs and few, if any, environmental benefits. 
The economic development rationale is not needed to justify the use of 
eminent domain for environmental protection. On the other hand, it can 
be, and has been, used to justify condemnations that inflict environmental 
harms. For this reason, the rule embodied by Kelo will result in 
environmental harm. 
As this Article goes to press, legislatures and local communities around 
the country are considering efforts to reform or limit the use of eminent 
domain.255 Some thirty-five states have already adopted post-Kelo reform 
laws.256 Litigation over the constitutionality of economic development 
takings also continues in state courts.257 These efforts are largely 
motivated by concerns about the equity and efficiency of eminent domain. 
 
 
finding that members of the Sierra Club have an average household income more than double the U.S. 
average). 
 254. See Matthew J. Kotchen & Shawn M. Powers, Explaining the Appearance and Success of 
Voter Referenda for Open-Space Conservation, 52 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 373 (2006). 
 255. For a detailed list of post-Kelo reforms adopted so far, see Castle Coalition, Enacted 
Legislation, http://www.castlecoalition.org/legislation/passed/index.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2007); 
see also Somin, Limits of Backlash, supra note 3, at 10–11. 
 256. Somin, Limits of Backlash, supra note 3 (discussing reform in thirty-five states); CASTLE 
COALITION, LEGISLATIVE ACTION SINCE KELO 1 (2007), http://www.castlecoalition.org/pdf/ 
publications/State-Summary-Publication.pdf (listing thirty-four states, but not counting reform enacted 
in Nevada). Unfortunately, most of the laws adopted so far are likely to be ineffective. See Sandefur, 
supra note 3; Somin, Limits of Backlash, supra note 3, at 11–22. 
 257. See, e.g., Bd. of County Comm’rs of Muskogee County v. Lowery, 136 P.3d 639, 642 (Okla. 
2006) (post-Kelo decision banning economic development takings under state constitutional law). 
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But the potential environmental consequences of eminent domain should 
also be considered in these efforts. Prohibiting economic development 
takings, as some states have already done, will not hamper ongoing efforts 
to conserve environmental values. Similarly, states should adopt measures 
to guard against the opportunistic use of blight designations and other 
methods of circumventing the limits on eminent domain abuse; a 
prohibition on economic development takings can only protect 
undeveloped lands from eminent domain if it is diligently enforced. 
During the debate over Kelo, few environmental advocates voiced 
concerns about the threat posed by economic development takings, and 
some even claimed that the decision would advance the cause of 
environmental protection. This is regrettable. Economic development 
takings pose a significant threat to environmental quality, while providing 
few if any environmental benefits. 
 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol84/iss3/3
